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I.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). On January 6, 2009 this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue N o . 1: Is an insurance policy voidable by the policyholder when the
insurer is not licensed by the department of insurance?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be reviewed for

correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). The denial of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be reversed only if no set of facts would
support relief. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd„ 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
Issue N o . 2: Does the Utah Insurance Code limit the original jurisdiction and
power of a district court to rescind or avoid an insurance policy?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be reviewed for
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999).
Issue N o . 3: Did the Car Dealers fail to "marshal all the record evidence that
supports the challenged finding" under Appellate Rule 24 in their
objections to class certification?
Standard of Review: The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure govern the procedure in
this court "in all cases." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1(a).
Issue N o . 4: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in certifying classes to
resolve the disputes concerning the dealerships' Vehicle Theft
Insurance policies?
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Standard of Review: A class certification under Rule 23 will be sustained unless the
trial court abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986).
In determining whether a class should be certified, the Plaintiffs' substantive allegations of are
to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
I s s u e N o . 5: D i d the trial court a b u s e its discretion in certifying c l a s s e s to
resolve the d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g the d e a l e r s h i p s ' G u a r a n t e e d A u t o
Protection (GAP) insurance policies?
Standard of Review: A class certification under Rule 23 will be sustained unless the
trial court abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986).
In determining whether a class should be certified, the Plaintiffs' substantive allegations of are
to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).

I s s u e N o . 6: D i d the trial court a b u s e its discretion in certifying c l a s s e s to
resolve the d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g the dealerships' D o c u m e n t a r y
Service F e e s ?
Standard of Review: A class certification under Rule 23 will be sustained unless the
trial court abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986).
In determining whether a class should be certified, the Plaintiffs' substantive allegations of are
to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
III.

D E T E R M I N A T I V E LAW
T h e following Constitutional and statutory rules govern: Utah Constitution, Article

V I I I , Section 5; Utah Code Ann.§31A-15-101(2); Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-105; Utah Code
A n n . §31A-1-301 (163)(a); Utah Code Ann.§31A-2-309(l)(c); Utah Code A n n . §31A-15-102;
Utah Code A n n . §31A-15-104(3)(a); Utah Code Ann.§31A-15-105; Utah Code Ann.
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§78A-5-102(l). These rules apply: Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. These cases apply: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
616 (1997); Call v. City of West Tordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986); Surety Underwriters
v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000).
IV.

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS RELIED O N BY T H E TRIAL
COURT IN SUPPORT OF CLASS CERTIFICATION O N ALL CAUSES OF
ACTION.
The Policyholders/Car Buyers concur with Car Dealers' Statement of the case except
their Statements of Fact. As described by the trial court in its July 30, 2008 Order, the court
relied on tables of alleged facts produced by Plaintiff. (Addendum A, Trial Court Order, ^[18,
ROA 2158). In applying the Rule 23 analysis adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle & jacquelin, supra, the trial court treated these facts as true. (Addendum A, Trial
Court Order, f l 8 , ROA 2158). For this reason, Car Dealers' contrary facts are not relevant at
this stage of the case. Many of the facts from the tables relied on by the trial court are
described below:
[Facts 1 through 9 are taken from the Table 1 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO D E F E N D A N T S ' RENEWED AND
A M E N D E D MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA
1838].

3
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1.

Plaintiffs are buyers of vehicles from Midway A u t o Pla2a ("Midway") in

Layton, Utah and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi ("Riddle") in W o o d s Cross, Utah. Support: Admitted
in Answer to Second Amended Complaint. (KOA
2.

1846).

Plaintiffs alleged a variety of causes of action for fraud, violations of the

C o n s u m e r Sales Practices Act and other wrongs in their Complaint (filed on D e c e m b e r 30,
2004). Plaintiffs filed a Class Action A m e n d e d Complaint on J u n e 1, 2005, seeking class
status for three wrongs: Defendants' charges for "Dealer D o c u m e n t a r y Service Fees,"
Defendants' "Vehicle Theft" policies, and Defendants' " G A P Insurance" policies. Support: See
pleadings on file. (KOA
3.

1846).

Plaintiffs' individual claims for fraud and other violations have been severed

from this case as provided in the Stipulated Case Management O r d e r entered on March 2 3 ,
2006 and will proceed as separate cases. Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Second A m e n d e d
Complaint on N o v e m b e r 11, 2005 setting forth their class causes of action as described in the
Stipulated Case Management Order. Support: See pleadings (KOA 1847, Class Action Second
Amended Complaint KOA
4.

183).

T h e two dealerships are owned by separate entities created and controlled by

Michael Riddle; they share c o m m o n m a n a g e m e n t and policies. Support: Corporate document and
other evidence will be produced at trial. (KOA
5.

1847).

Midway was opened by Mike Riddle in 2000. Mike Riddle opened Mike Riddle

Mitsubishi in 2004. Both dealerships run used car businesses; Riddle also sells new cars.
Support: Admitted in Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories, answer 1. (KOA

1847).
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6.

Midway and Riddle are part of the small fraction of Utah dealers who finance

their own sales by having the customers sign installment contracts payable to the dealer.
Support: Both dealerships use installment sales contracts "on every deal." Deposition of Daniel LePelley
(General Manager of Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi) at 18:7. (KOA 1848).
7.

Midway and Riddle finance virtually all of their used car sales by executing sales

contracts between them and the car buyers. Support: Both dealerships use installment sales contracts
"on every deal." Deposition of Daniel LePelley (General Manager of Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi)
at 18:7. (KOA 1848).
8.

After the sale, Midway and Riddle sell and assign their contracts to other

lenders, who collect the installment payments scheduled in the dealer installment contract.
Support: All financing was made in this way with few exceptions. Deposition of Spencer Castle (General
Manager of Midway), at 56:19. (KOA 1848).
9.

The evidence will show that Defendants target unsophisticated consumers -

often military people, young couples and people with little or poor credit. Support: Evidence of
Defendants'marketing will be produced at trial. (KOA 1848).
Facts alleged in Support of the Vehicle Theft Insurance Causes of Action
[Facts 9 through 40 are taken from the Table 2 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO D E F E N D A N T S ' RENEWED AND
A M E N D E D MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA
1838].
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10.

Defendants sell "Vehicle Theft" policies which pay up to $5,000 if the buyer's

car is stolen. Support: See Vehicle Theft, policy attached as Exhibit "I" to P's Reply Memo to Certify
Vehicle Theft Insurance claims. (ROA
11.

1860).

A n important part of the sales pitch for these products is the promise of a

monetary payment if the car is stolen. Support: Testimony given by David Griffiths and Jason Earl
(Midway and Riddle Mitsubishi Finance Manager) attached to P's Reply Memo re Vehicle Theft Insurance.
(ROA

1861).
12.

Defendants are licensed as limited lines insurance producers to sell credit

insurance. Support: Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi; Utah Insurance Certificates, attached as
Exhibits "J" and "K" to P's Reply Memo re: Gap Insurance. (ROA
13.

1862).

T h e Defendants are n o t licensed to sell property insurance or theft insurance.

Support: Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi Utah Insurance Certificates, attached as Exhibits "J" and
"K" to P's Reply Memo re: Gap Insurance. Also, testimony of Spencer Castle, former general manager of
Midway. Castle Dep., 20:14;. testimony of Jason Earl, Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi finance
manager. Earl Dep., 48:6-12.
14.

(ROA

1862).

Defendants have sold two "theft-protection p r o d u c t s " which they promise will

deter car theft: Edge-guard and V T P . Support: Defs' Answers to Interrogatories, Answer No. 7.
ROA

1862).
15.

Both Midway and Riddle are authorized dealers for E d g e - G u a r d warrantees on

Etch. Support: Defs' Answers to Interrogatories, Answer No. 7. (ROA

1862).
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16.

"Etch" refers to the etching of a small identification number on the windows

of a car, which is promoted as a deterrent against theft. Support: Defs' Answers to Interrogatory
No. 8; David Griffiths Dep. at 40:17. (KOA 1863).
17.

Defendants etch the small numbers with acid on the windows of every car in

their inventory before the purchaser comes onto the lot. Support: Defs1 Answers to Interrog. No.
8. (KOA 1863).
18.

If the car buyer pays a premium of $299.95 for the guarantee policy, the etched

number is registered with a database at an undisclosed location, and the car buyer is given a
warranty policy. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogatories no. 8; Vehicle Theft policy attached as
Exhibit "H" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (KOA 1863).
19.

The promise of a "$2,500 & $5,000 Benefit Recovery Guarantee" if the car is

stolen is the most prominent feature (in large, bold type) of the guarantee policy.( A copy is
attached as Exhibit "A"). Support: Vehicle Theft policy attached as Exhibit "H" to P's Reply Memo re:
Vehicle Theft Insurance. (KOA 1863).
20.

The policy is silent as to who actually pays the benefit, but the dealer signs the

policy. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogatories no. 8; Vehicle Theft policy attached as Exhibit "H" to
P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1864).
21.

Named Plaintiff Severo Rodriguez bought an Edge-Guard policy for $299.95

from Midway Auto Plaza on June 1, 2004. Support: Rodrigue^ Motor Vehicle Purchase Contract,
attached as Exhibit "L" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1864).
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22.

Named Plaintiff Nicholas Rodarte bought an Edge-Guard policy for $299.95

from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi on May 22, 2004. Support: Rodarte Motor Vehicle Purchase Contract,
attached as Exhibit "M" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1864).
23.

Midway sold a product called "VTP" in the years 2001 through 2003. Support:

Answers to Defs' Interrogatories, Numbers, 6 and 7. (ROA 1864).
24.

"VTP" stands for "Vehicle Theft Protection," the name used on the product

warranty policy for a starter interrupt which was intended to deter (not prevent) theft. Support:
VTP policy attached as Exhibit "H" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1865).
25. Midway installed the starter-interrupts on certain types of cars in their inventory
before the car buyers came to the lot. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogs., ans. 8. (ROA 1865).
26.

Car buyers who paid the premium of up to $3,500 were supposed to receive a

key to activate the starter interrupt and a warranty policy promising money if the car was
stolen. Support: Answers to Defs Interrogatories, 8; Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "H;"
Dalton Jaques, Motor Vehicle Sales Contract, attached as Exhibit "N;" both exhibits to P's
Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (Plaintiff Dalton Jaques was charged $3,500 for
VTP.) (ROA 1865).
27.

The "VTP" warranty policy promised "up to $1,500" if the car was stolen and

not recovered. Support: Answers to Defs' Interrogatories, no. 8; Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit
"H" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA 1866).
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28.

Only the car dealer signed the policies. Support: Copy of VTPpolicy,

attached as

Exhibit "H"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as Exhibit "0" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft
Insurance. (ROA
29.

1866).

In the V T P policy, the benefit was to be paid by " V T P Vehicle Theft

Protection," an unregistered d.b.a. of "Competitive Dealer Services," an unregistered d.b.a.
of Michelle Davis of Bountiful, Utah. Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit

"M";

Depo. of Michelle Davis 4:24; both exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA
30.

1867).

Michelle Davis sells G A P insurance waivers and vehicle theft policies to car

dealers in Utah. Support: Davis Dep., 8:8, exhibit to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance.
(ROA

1867).
31.

D e f e n d a n t Midway purchased the starter-interrupts and policy forms from

Michelle Davis. Support: Davis Dep., 13:14; 14:25-15:2, exhibit to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft
Insurance. (ROA
32.

1867).

Plaintiff Dalton Jaques purchased a V T P policy for $3,500 from Midway A u t o

Plaza on August 9, 2004. Support: Dalton Jaques, Motor Vehicle Sales Contract, attached as Exhibit
"M" to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA
33.

1868).

Both E d g e - G u a r d and V T P warranty policies contain the disclaimer, this "is

n o t an insurance policy." Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard
policy, attached as Exhibit "O" to P's Reply Memo re: VT insurance. (ROA
34.

1868).

T h e transfer of risk from the car owner coupled with the promise of monetary

benefits are important and material parts of both "products." Support: Griffiths Dep.,
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42:21-43:8; Davis Dep., 42:15; Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard
policy, attached as Exhibit
35.

"O." All were exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: VT Insurance. (ROA

1869).

Both the E d g e - G u a r d and V T P policies provide monetary benefits

supplementing the car buyer's own comprehensive auto insurance policy. Support: Copy of
VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as Exhibit "0." Both were
exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle Theft Insurance. (ROA
36.

1869).

By tying the actual payout of benefits to the car owners deductible on his

comprehensive auto policy, the creators of the E d g e - G u a r d and V T P policies limit actual
payouts to far less than the a m o u n t s advertised. (Deductible on comprehensive auto policies
are m u c h lower than the promised payouts of $5,000, $2,500 or $1,500 in these vehicle theft
policies.) Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as Exhibit "I"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as
Exhibit

"O"; judicial notice. All were exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: VT Insurance. (ROA
37.

1870). •

Both the V T P and E d g e - G u a r d policies contain claims provisions m u c h m o r e

restrictive than those of qualified insurance policies. Support: Copy of VTP policy, attached as
Exhibit

"I"; Copy of Edge-Guard policy, attached as Exhibit

"O;" exhibits to P's Reply Memo re: Vehicle

Theft Insurance. Compare with Utah Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-301-303
31A-21-203

(authorised clauses in insurance forms), and31A-21-312

(claims),

(notices and proof of loss). (ROA

1871).
38.

T h e promises of monetary benefits are made by companies or people w h o

could never qualify as insurers in Utah, or in any other state. Support: The evidence at trial show
that the insurers of these policies lack sufficient reserves and stability to qualify as insurers in Utah and all
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other states, which require similarfinancial security. Defendants are not qualified in Utah to act as insurers.
See Affidavit of Jack C. Helgesen with the list of Utah insurers, attached as Exhibit

,f

N;" August 17,

2007 letters from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, & Property Division of the Utah State Insurance
Department, attached as Addendum D,R0A-1739-1742.
39.

(ROA

1872).

Midway has sold m o r e than 1,500 Vehicle Theft policies from 2000 through

2006; m o r e than 1,300 of these policies were for " V T P " . Support: Defs Answers to Interrogatories,
No. 6. (ROA
40.

1873).
Riddle has sold m o r e than 1,150 Vehicle Theft policies from 2004 through

2006; all of these policies were for E d g e - G u a r d . Support: DefsAns

to Interrogs, No. 6.

(ROA

1873).
[Facts 41 through 44 are taken from the Table 1 A D D E N D U M T O P L A I N T I F F S ' R E P L Y
M E M O R A N D U M IN SUPPORT O F PLAINTIFFS' M O T I O N FOR CERTIFICATION
O F CLASS R E : V E H I C L E T H E F T P O L I C I E S , pp. 17-18. R O A 1464].
41.

T h e Utah D e p a r t m e n t of Insurance regulates auto dealers' vehicle theft policies

as insurance. Support: Letter from Brad Tippitts, Director of the Property and Casualty Division of the
Utah Insurance Department, to Craig Bickmore of the Utah Automobile Dealers Association, these policies
may not be offered <(unless an insurer with a certificate of authority to do business in Utah provides the
provision for payment." (See September 9, 2005 letterfrom Utah Insurance Department, third paragraph,
attached as Addendum E, ROA
42.

1749). (ROA

1483).

T h e E d g e - G u a r d policies were n o t written by a qualified insurer. Support: As

described in the policy, the apparent source ofpajments is "The Edge Program Administrator.
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<r

The Edge}) is

an assumed name of The Edge Financial Services, LLC., which is owned by David Griffiths. Mr. Griffiths,
the person who sold the Edge-Guard policies to Defendants, identified the underwriter of the Edge-Guard
policy as ''Dealers Motor Services out of New Jersey." (See Griffiths Dep., 44:19-45:2). (ROA 14801481).
43.

Neither The Edge Program Administrator nor Dealers Motor Services is an

insurance company authorized to do business in Utah. Support: List of Property <& Casualty, Life
and Health Authorised Insurance Companies in Utah, ROA 1745). (ROA 1481).
44.

An insurance company is "behind" The Edge-Guard policies, but is not the

underwriter and is not in privity with the policyholder. Support: David Griffiths testified that
'Lloyds of London" is "behind" the Edge-Guard policy, but they are not the underwriter. (See Griffiths
Dep., 44:19-45:2; 60:4). 'Lloyds of London" does not have even have the car buyer's name. (See Griffiths
Dep., 60:4). (ROA 1481).
Facts alleged in Support of the GAP Insurance Causes of Action
[Facts 45 through 62 are taken from the Table 3 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO D E F E N D A N T S ' RENEWED AND
A M E N D E D MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA
1838].
45.

When a car is totaled in an accident, GAP insurance will pay the remaining

balance of the car loan (the "gap") after the owner's comprehensive insurance coverage has
paid. Support: Spencer Castle Dep, 37:4. (ROA 1874).
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46.

G A P insurance is useful w h e n the car buyer is "upside d o w n " in a car, owing

m o r e than the car is worth. Support: DanielLePellej
41'.

Dep., 43:13.

(ROA

1874).

As sold by m o s t lenders, G A P insurance is a three party agreement in which

the car buyer purchases insurance underwritten by a commercial insurance company to pay
the lender if the car is destroyed. Support: David Griffiths Dep., at 11 (this is "traditional" GAP
insurance). (KOA
48.

1874).

Car buyers in Utah can purchase G A P insurance from banks, credit unions,

finance companies, from the internet and from m o s t large car dealers. Support: This testimony
will be provided at trial. (KOA
49.

1875).

Defendants sell a modified version of G A P often referred to as a " G A P

waiver." Support: Examples of GAP contracts, attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply Memo to
Certify GAP.
50.

(KOA

1875).

Defendants' G A P waivers are two-party insurance contracts between the dealer

and the car buyer. Support: Examples of GAP contracts, attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply
Memo to Certify GAP.
51.

(ROA

1875).

T h e premium for Defendants' " G A P waivers" is m u c h higher than the car

buyer would pay if he bought typical G A P insurance underwritten by a qualified insurance
company. Support: Plaintiffs will produce this testimony at trial. Specific Objection: "Unsupported
and inadmissible, speculative; conclusory, contains characterisations of counsel." (ROA
52.

1876).

T h e premium, usually between $500 and $600, buys forgiveness (waiver) of the

balance owed under the installment sales contract if the car is destroyed. Support: Midway's
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Answers to Interrogatories, Answer 5; Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi Answers to Interrogatories, Answer 5.
(ROA

1876).
53.

Defendants sell the buyer an official looking policy providing for waiver, which

is really an a d d e n d u m to the installment sales contract. Support: Examples of GAP contracts,
attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP.
54.

(ROA

1876).

In some of Defendants' G A P waiver policies, a foreign business called Beacon

Industries Worldwide, Inc. ("Beacon") assumes the risk of the loss of the car in the contract.
Support: See Beacon GAP policy, attached as Exhibit "K" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP.

(ROA

1877).
55.

In all other of Defendants G A P waiver policies n o t sold by Beacon, the

D e f e n d a n t dealerships assume the risk of the loss of the car as the principal in the insurance
contract. Support: Examples of GAP contracts, attached as Exhibits "I" and "J." to P's Reply Memo to
Certify GAP.
56.

(ROA

1877).

These policies are written and sold to Defendants by agents for foreign

companies w h o act as G A P "administrators" to receive claims and decide whether the dealer
should accept or deny them. Support: See Exhibit

"L" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP.

(ROA

1878).
57.

If the "administrator" accepts the claim, the Dealer or its successor waives the

balance owed on the installment sales contract after payment from the car owner's collision
insurance. Support: See Exhibit "L" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP.

(ROA
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1878).

58. Midway sold more than 1,500 GAP policies since opening in 2000; 328 of these
policies were from Beacon. Support: Midway's Answers to Interrogs, Answer 5. (ROA 1879).
59.

Riddle has sold more than 1,140 GAP policies since opening in 2004; 346 of

these policies were from Beacon. Support: Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi Answers to Interrogatories,
Answer 5. (ROA 1879).
60.

Like most larger Utah motor vehicle dealers, Defendants are licensed as a

"Limited Lines producers" to sell GAP insurance - but only if the policies are underwritten
by qualified insurers and comply with Utah insurance laws. Support: See Defendants' insurance
licenses, attached as Exhibit "M" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. "The commissioner will allow a
dealer who has a limited lines license to sell insurance products for a licensed insurance company. The
commissioner does not allow a dealer to act as an insurance company unless they are licensed as such. "August
17, 2007 letter re: GAP Waiver Insurance from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, <& Property Division of
the Utah State Insurance Dept., attached as Addendum D to this brief. (ROA 1880).
61.

The Defendants are not licensed as insurers in Utah. Support: See Defendants'

insurance licenses, attached as Exhibit "M" to P's Reply Memo to Certify GAP. Also: See Affidavit of
Jack C. Helgesen with the list of Utah insurers, attached as Exhibit "N." August 17, 2007 letter re: GAP
Waiver Insurance from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, & Property Division of the Utah State Insurance
Department, attached as Addendum D). (ROA 1881).
62.

Beacon is not a licensed insurer in Utah. Support: See Affidavit of Jack C. Helgesen

with the list of Utah insurers, attached as Exhibit "N. "August 17, 2007 letter re: GAP Waiver Insurance
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from Brad Tibbitts, Director of Life, <& Property Division of the Utah State Insurance Department,
attached as Addendum H, RAO 1739 to 1742. (ROA 1882).
Facts alleged in Support of the Documentary Service Fee Causes of Action
[Facts 63 through 89 are taken from the Table 3 Addendum to PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO D E F E N D A N T S ' R E N E W E D AND
A M E N D E D MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENTS OF FACT, ROA
1838].
63.

Each of the named Plaintiffs, who purchased a vehicle from Defendants' -

dealerships, was required to pay from $249.95 to $399.95 for a "Dealer Documentary Service
Fee." The amount of the Documentary Service Fees, ("Documentary Fee") was the same at
both dealerships. Support: See Defendants' Answers to Interrogs, answer 2. (ROA 1849, 1850).
64.

The Documentary Fee is a dealer imposed charge to reimburse the dealer for

preparing the sales documents and for obtaining the license plates for the car buyer. This fee
is not required by state or local law. Support: The first sentence was admitted in Defendant's Answer
(to Second Amended Complaint), allegation. (ROA 1850).
65.

By state regulation, a "dealer documentary service fee" represents costs and

profit to the dealer for preparing and processing documents and other services related to the
sale or lease of (the) vehicle. These fees are not set or state mandated by state statute or rule."
Support: Rule R877-23V-14 of the Utah Administrative Code. (ROA 1850).
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66.

At Midway and Riddle, the D o c u m e n t a r y Fee is mostly additional profit to the

dealer. Support:"...it's pure profit." Support: Deposition of Jason Earl, Midway Finance Manager, at
29:11 and 33:23.
67.

(ROA

1850).

T h e D o c u m e n t a r y Fee is n o t discussed with the customer until after he or she

agrees in writing to buy the car, as explained below. Support: Salesmen were not trained to discuss
documentary fees with consumers. Deposition ofDaniel LePelley, Midway General Manager, at 27:5-28:2.
Salesmen are not expected to know what a documentary fee is or to discuss it with consumers Deposition of
Michael Dockery, salesman at both dealerships, at 16:1-17:3; also deposition of Deposition ofReid Teo , at
50:12 . The finance manager discussed it with the customer in the finance office after the customer signed a
commitment to buy the car. Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 16:23-17:2.; Depo.
of Danny LePelley,General Manager of Midway,(the finance manager is the one who tells the consumer he
canftbuy a car unless he pays the documentary fee), at 27:19. (ROA
68.

1851).

T h e sales process leading to the sale is the same at both dealerships. Support:

Deposition ofReid Teo, salesman at both dealerships, at 36:25-37:4 ; also deposition of Michael Dockery, at
11:11; 24:13; 27:4. (ROA
69.

1851).

All consumers w h o are serious about buying a car meet with a Midway or

Riddle salesman in a small sales area, usually a small cubicle by the main sales area of the
dealership. Support: Deposition ofReid Teo, salesman at both dealerships, at 45:1. See also Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact 11, Memorandum in Opposition. (ROA
70.

1852).

T h e salesman encourages the consumer to sign a "proposal worksheet"

containing the consumers offer to buy the car. Defendants' salesmen refer to the proposal
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worksheet as a " c o m m i t m e n t " or a "foursquare." Support: Deposition of Michael Dockery, salesman,
at 24:1. (KOA
71.

1852).
After the consumer signs the c o m m i t m e n t , the salesman takes it to a manager

w h o will make a handwritten counteroffer on the back side of the c o m m i t m e n t form. At
Midway and Riddle, the manager's offer is referred to as a "pencil." Support: See copy of the
manager's "pencil11 offer, attached as Addendum L to this brief (KOA
72.

1853).

T h e pencil offer from the manager includes the purchase price of the car

followed by the notation "+ T & L . " "T & L" refers to tax and license charges. Support: See
copy of the manager1s "pencil" offer, attached as Exhibit "B". Managers counter offers, which are part of the
sales "workup" or sales "commitment" process, offer to sell the car at a specific price "plus tax and license,"
and have never included a mention of the"term doc fees or anything like that." Depo. ofDaniel LePelley
Midway General Manager, at 29:5. (KOA
73.

1853).

For consumers w h o buy a car, the negotiations continue until the manager

makes a pencil offer the consumer accepts. T h e consumer then signs the manager's written
offer agreeing to buy the car for the price and terms described. Support: Depo. of Michael
Dockery, salesman, at 25:17, 26:22; Also depo. ofKeidTeo,

salesman at both dealerships, at 41:19-42:14

(Dealerships treated the car as sold when the consumer signed the pencil). (KOA
74.

1853).

After the consumer signs the c o m m i t m e n t to buy the car, the salesman assists

the car buyer with a basic credit application (if needed) and other information required to
complete the printed d o c u m e n t s . Support: Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at
16:25; Deposition of Michael Dockery, salesman, at 29:8. (KOA

1853).
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75.

The car buyer is then taken to a finance office to meet and sign the formal

documents. Support: Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 16:23-17:2; (See a
more complete discussion in support of ¥ act 17, above). (ROA 1854).
76.

The Documentary Fee is not included or mentioned in the offers and

counteroffers between the consumer and the manager. Support: Manager's counter offers, which are
part of the sales "workup" or sales "commitment" process, offer to sell the car at a specific price "plus tax and
license", and have never included a mention of the"term docfees or anything like that." Depo. of Daniel
LePelley, Midway General Manager, at 29:5. (See supportfor Fact 17, above). (ROA 1854).
11.

In the finance office, the finance manager presents the car buyer with the

formal Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. Support: Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact
17, Memorandum in Opposition. Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at 17:18-18:2.
(ROA 1854).
78.

On line 27 of Defendants' Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale is a preprinted

charge for Dealer Documentary Service Fees, currently $399.95. Support: Admitted by
Defendants in their Answer (to Second Amended Class Action Complaint), fact 96; Midway's Answer to
Interrogatories, Answer 2; and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi's Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 2.
See copy of a Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale attached as Addendum K to this brief. (ROA 1855).
79.

The Documentary Fee increases the price of the car above the charges agreed

to in the signed pencil agreement between the dealer and consumer. Support: Manager's counter
offers, which are part of the sales "workup" or sales "commitment" process, offer to sell the car at a specific
price "plus tax and license," and have never included a mention of the"term doc fees or anything like that."
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Deposition ofDaniel LePellej Midway General Manager, at 29:5. (See supportfor Fact 22, above). (KOA
1856).
80.

If the car buyer objects to the Documentary Fee, the dealership tells him the

charge is required for everyone. Support: Deposition of Daniel LePellej Midway General Manager, at
27:12-24 ("they have to pay a doc fee or they can't buy a car"). (KOA 1856).
81.

Defendants will not sell a car for the price agreed to in the signed pencil

agreement. Support: Manager's counter offers, which are part of the sales "workup" or sales "commitment"
process, offer to sell the car at a specific price "plus tax and license," and have never included a mention of
the"term doc fees or anything like that." Deposition ofDaniel LePelley Midway General Manager, at 29:5.
(See supportfor Facts 22 and 31 above) and at 27:12-24 ("they have to pay a doc fee or they can't buy a
car"). (KOA 1857).
82.

Defendants claim to have small 5" x 6M or 6" x 6" signs posted on the walls of

its finance offices explaining the Documentary Fee. Support: Deposition of Jason Earl, Finance
Manager at Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi, at 34:9, 39:9. (KOA 1857).
83.

Only consumers who have agreed to purchase a vehicle are taken into the

finance office. Support: Consumers went into thefinancearea only after they had completed the
preliminary paperwork for the sale. Depo. of]as on Earl, Finance Mgr. at Midway and Mike Kiddle
Mitsubishi, at 35:21-36:2; Depo. of Spencer Castle, Midway General Mgr., at 17:18. (KOA 1857).
84.

Documentary Fee signs are not posted in the sales areas or anywhere else

except the finance offices. Support: Deposition of Spencer Castle, Midway General Manager, at
46:20-47:40. Some witnesses say there is a small sign on the wall in a walkway back to the vehicle service
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area at Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi, but no signs have been in the sales areas where the car sales are negotiated.
Deposition of Jason Earl, Finance Manager at Midway and Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi, at 35:8-41:10.
(KOA 1858).
85.

None of the named Plaintiffs can recall seeing a Documentary Fee sign.

Support: Jaques Dep., 83:16; DellaGar^a Dep., 81:12; HeinerDep., 59:14; Holbrook Dep., 51:15;
Nielson Dep., 82:7; and Rodriguez Dep., 56:15. (KOA 1858).
86.

The Defendant Dealerships have charged a Dealer Documentary Service Fee

to every purchaser and lessee of a motor vehicle at their dealerships for all time periods
relevant to this action. Support: Deposition of Daniel LePellej Midway General Manager, at 27:12-24
("they have to pay a doc fee or they can't buy a car"). (KOA 1858).
87.

Midway charged $249.00 for Documentary Fees from 2000 through January

31, 2002; $289.95 until September 19, 2003; $299.95 until August 20, 2004; and $399.95 to
the present. Since its opening in February, 2004, Riddle has charged the same as Midway for
Documentary Fees. Support: Midway's Answer to Interrogatories, answer 2; Mike Kiddle Mitsubishi's
Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 2. (KOA 1859).
88.

Midway sold 315 vehicles in 2000, 399 in 2001, 816 in 2002, 857 in 2003, 714

in 2004, 668 in 2005, and 493 in 2006. Support: Midway's Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 1.
(KOA 1859).
89.

Riddle sold 759 vehicles in 2004, 919 in 2005, and 572 in 2006. Support: Mike

Riddle Mitsubishi's Answer to Interrogatories, Answer 1. (ROA 1859).
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
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T h e trial court properly denied the Car Dealers' motion to dismiss the insurance
causes of action for failing to state a claim under Utah Code A n n . §31 A-15-105(2) because its
plain meaning makes contracts by unlicensed insurers voidable by the policyholder. T h e trial
court correctly ruled that each "policyholder may avoid the contract." IcL
T h e Car Dealers have cited to the statute but they have n o t addressed its meaning.
T h e Car Dealers' argument that an insurance contract with an unauthorized insurer
can be avoided only through an administrative process is contrary to the plain wording of the
statute which describes the procedure: " T h e policyholder may avoid the contract by notice to
the insurer." IcL T h e legislative history of §31 A-15-105(2) is unnecessary to explain its plain
w o r d s and does n o t support the Car Dealers' view of the statute.
T h e Car Dealers' idea that Utah courts lack jurisdiction to avoid an insurance contract
with an unauthorized insurer begins with this faulty premise: "the power of enforcement for
any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the insurance commissioner."
(Appellants' Brief, p. 23) Court jurisdiction is presumed, and is supported by the wording of
§31A-15-105, the insurance code and chapter 15, which purposes to "subject unauthorized
insurers. . .to the jurisdiction of. . .courts." Utah Code Ann.§31A-15-101(2). See Utah C o d e
A n n . §31A-1-105 (unauthorized insurers are subject to "the jurisdiction of. . .the courts of
this state.") Case law supports the courts' role in applying the insurance code to insurance
contract disputes, and nothing in the Insurance Code injects the commissioner into contract
disputes between parties to insurance policies. T h e Utah Supreme Court applied the
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substantive rules of Utah Code A n n . §31A-1-105 to resolve a policy dispute in Surety
Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000).
In challenging class certification, the Car Dealers have argued their own set of facts
and have n o t met their duty under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
marshal the record evidence relied on by the trial court.
T h e trial court did n o t abuse its discretion under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure in certifying class actions on the insurance (VTP and G A P ) and the documentary
fee (Doc Fees) causes of action. In applying Rule 2 3 , the court is required to accept the
substantive allegations of the complaint as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,
177-78 (1974). T h e Policyholders have alleged that none of the insurers in the Car Dealers'
vehicle theft policies and G A P policies are licensed in Utah law, and that all of the vehicle
theft policies are unlawful for other reasons. O n the issue of D o c Fees, the Car Buyers
complain that the Car Dealers' practice in every sale commits car buyers to a contract price
before the Dealer gives notice of their $399.95 mandatory charge for d o c u m e n t preparation.
Every sale violates Utah law. T h e trial court correctly found "the issues are n o t so complicated
as argued by the defendants" (Addendum A, \ 36), and that individual variations in sales do
n o t matter in resolving the Policyholders'/Car Buyers' legal issues.
T h e trial court did n o t abuse its discretion in finding "each of the claims presented by
the m e m b e r s of the p r o p o s e d classes is so small on its own that it would n o t be worthwhile
for those individuals to bring their own claims in separate, individual lawsuits." (Addendum
A, f 68). This is the "policy at the very core of the class action mechanism." A m c h e m
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Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997). It also follows the Utah Supreme
Court's approval of class actions to allow "access to the courts for numerous claimants to
request redress of claims that are too small to merit the expenses of litigation on an individual
basis." Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). In this case, a class action
is the only method for change and redress of the wrongs by these Car Dealers.
VI.

ARGUMENT

A. T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY D E N I E D T H E CAR DEALERS' M O T I O N
TO DISMISS
1.

REVERSAL OF T H E M O T I O N TO DISMISS WOULD BE IMPROPER
BECAUSE T H E CAR DEALERS HAVE N O T CHALLENGED T H E
O T H E R I N S U R A N C E CAUSES OF ACTION IN THIS APPEAL.
In their appeal of the trial Court's denial of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class

Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Policies, the Car Dealers limit the
scope of the issues to a review of the Policyholders' cause of action under Utah Code Ann.
§31 A-l 5-105 of the insurance code. (Appellants' brief, Statement of the Issues, p. 1). They
did not argue for dismissal of the contract rescission causes of action in the trial court, and
the trial court's ruling did not address them. See Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
839 P.2d 798, 806 (Utah 1992)("we necessarily retain authority to invalidate insurance
provisions that are found contrary to public policy as expressed in the common law of
contracts"); Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 931 (Utah 2002).
2.

T H E POLICYHOLDERS HAVE STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION TO
AVOID T H E I R INSURANCE CONTRACTS AS DESCRIBED IN §31A-15105 OF T H E INSURANCE CODE.
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[Response to the Car Dealers' argument that an insurance policy is voidable only by the
Insurance Commissioner; that policyholders have no private right of action. (Brief, pp. 2335.)].
A.

Plaintiffs have stated proper causes of action for avoidance of contract
under Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105.
1. Unlicensed insurers

Chapter 15 of the Utah Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l 5-101 et. seq.,
defines the legal treatment of Unauthorized Insurers. In the Insurance Code, an
"unauthorized insurer" is defined as an unlicensed insurer. Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l-301
(163)(a).
Policyholders allege that none of the insurers in the Car Dealer's Vehicle Theft
insurance contracts and GAP insurance contracts are licensed in Utah. (Statement of Facts
No. 38, 42, 43, 61, and 62). This fact should be taken as true in an appeal from denial of a
motion to dismiss. Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249, 1250 (Utah App. 1996).
2. Car Dealers' Violations of Chapter 15
In selling their Vehicle Theft and GAP insurance contracts, the Car Dealers violated
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-l5-102(1) which prohibits "any act" by a person "who knows or
should know the act may assist in the placement of insurance with an unauthorized insurer."
Such acts are punishable as a third degree felony. IcL §31 A-l5-102(5). The Car Dealers and
their insurance salesmen are licensed Utah insurance agents who are presumed to know the
laws pertaining to their license. Smith v. Mahoney, 590 P.2d 323, 324 (Utah 1979). They
should know the insurers in the contracts they sell are not licensed.
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T h e Car Dealers' Vehicle Theft insurance contracts also violate Utah C o d e A n n .
§31A-15-104, which reads: "Any insurance on personal property sold.. under a ... security agreement...
which charges the buyer, as part of the consideration in the agreement of sale for insurance on the property,
shall be placed with an insurer authorised to do business in Utah." (emphasis added).
3. Contracts are v o i d a b l e w h e n the insurer is u n a u t h o r i z e d
Utah C o d e A n n . §31 A - l 5-105 provides the remedy for violations of Chapter 15.
§31A-15-105. Effect of Contracts illegal because insurer was
unauthorized.
(1) A contract entered into in violation of this chapter is unenforceable
by, but enforceable against the insurer. ...
(2) A n insurance policy entered into in violation of this chapter is
voidable by the policyholder w h o entered into the transaction without
knowing it was illegal. T h e policyholder may avoid the contract by
notice to the insurer, if no insured has enforced the contract by an
action under Subsection (1), and may recover any consideration paid
under the contract.
Utah Code A n n . §31A-15-105 (1986)(Addendum C).
B.

T h e Car D e a l e r s h a v e n o t d i s c u s s e d the plain l a n g u a g e of §31A-15-105.

[Response to the Car Dealers' argument that an insurance policy is voidable only by the
Insurance Commissioner; that policyholders have no private right of action; that Appellees
have failed to cite any express statutory authority for their remedy (Brief, p p . 23-35.)].
"Under our established rules of statutory construction, we look first to the plain
meaning of the pertinent language in interpreting a statute; only if the language is ambiguous
do we consider other sources for its meaning." Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor C o m m ' n ,
2006 U T 58, 147 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Utah 2006).
1. Car D e a l e r s ' V i e w of the Statute

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Surprisingly, the Car Dealers referenced Utah Code §31A-15-105 five times in their
argument (Appellant's Brief, p p . 24, 25, 26, 27 and 30) without ever explaining what they
believe it means.
2. T h e P o l i c y h o l d e r s ' V i e w of the Statute
Utah Code A n n . §31A-15-105 gives policyholders an e x p r e s s contract r e m e d y to
avoid insurance contracts with unauthorized (unlicensed) insurers. T h e plain language of the
statute refutes Car Dealers' arguments.
Question: W h o may avoid the contract? T h e Car Dealers say that only the
Commissioner can avoid the contract (Appellants' Brief, p p . 2 3 , 24, 27, 30). T h e statute says:
"An insurance policy. . .is voidable by the policyholder. . .The policyholder may avoid the contract/''Utah
Code A n n . §31A-15-105(2) (emphasis added).
Question: H o w is avoidance accomplished?

T h e Car Dealers say the contract can

be avoided only through an administrative process with the Insurance Commission.
(Appellants' Brief, p p . 30-31.) T h e statute says: " T h e policyholder may avoid the contract by
notice to the insured." IcL
Question: W h o may recover the consideration paid?

T h e Car Dealers say the

Commissioner must recover the consideration for the policyholders. (Appellants' brief, p . 30).
T h e statute says: "The policyholder... may recover the consideration paid under the contract." Id.
T h e statute is plain and unambiguous in giving the policyholder the remedy.
C.

Legislative history: U t a h C o d e A n n . §31A-15-105 c h a n g e d the
substantive law of i n s u r a n c e contracts and a d o p t e d the c o m m o n law
r e m e d y for a v o i d a b l e contract.
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[Response to the Car dealers' argument that "nothing in the history suggests that the
language of the previous act... was altered to provide a new private right of action for
individuals..." (Brief, p. 29.)].
1.
Chapter 15 of the U t a h I n s u r a n c e C o d e subjects u n l i c e n s e d
insurers to the jurisdiction of U t a h courts b e c a u s e it incorporates t w o
prior A c t s , o n e of w h i c h expressly required court jurisdiction.
Utah, like m o s t states, has a history of imposing various sanctions on unlicensed
insurers doing business in the state. See: Couch on Insurance 3d §§ 3:39-3:40 (1999). Before
the 1984 insurance code revision, those sanctions were found in two Acts: T h e
"Unauthorized Insurers Act," Utah Code A n n . §31-38-1, et. seq.(1963)(repealed 1985),
Appellants' A d d e n d u m C; and the "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act," Utah Code Ann.
§31-35-l(1963)(repealed 1985), A d d e n d u m M to this brief.
a).

T h e Car Dealers have discussed the prior Utah Code A n n . §31-38-1. T h e Car

Dealers have discussed the prior "Unauthorized Insurers Act," Code Ann. §31-38-1, et.
seq.(1963)(repealed 1985) which gave the commissioner authority to file a Complaint for
injunctive relief in district against an unlicensed insurer and appointed the Secretary of State
as the agent to receive process in lawsuits filed by the state. F o r m e r §§31-38-4 and 5. T h e
Act had the purpose of subjecting unlicensed insurers "to the jurisdiction of the insurance
commissioner and the courts of this state in suits b r o u g h t by or on behalf of the
state,"(Appellants argue this describes the entire purpose of the current act). (Appellants'
Brief, p p . 28-29).
b).

T h e Car Dealers have N O T discussed the prior Utah Code A n n . §31-35-1.
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T h e "Unauthorized Insurers Process Act," Utah Code Ann.(1963)(repealed 1985),
A d d e n d u m M, had the express purpose of making unlicensed insurers "subject...

to the

jurisdiction

or

beneficiaries

of the courts of this state in suits brought by or on behalf of insureds

under insurance contracts." §31-35-2 (1963)(emphasis added). That Act: 1)

appointed the commissioner to receive process in lawsuits filed by policyholders (§31-35-2);
2) required an unlicensed insurer to obtain a certificate of authority (license) before filing a
pleading in a lawsuit filed against it by a policyholder (§31-35-4); and 3) provided for an
award of attorneys fees in policyholder lawsuits on the contract (§31-35-5).
c).

T h e current Unauthorized Insurers Act combined the two prior acts and

expanded its purpose. In 1985, the authority of the commissioner and the sanctions against
unlicensed insurers in privately filed lawsuits were combined into the new Chapter 15, the
Utah "Unauthorized Insurers Act." T h e former §§31-38-4 (lawsuits by the commissioner)
became the current §31 A-15-211. T h e former §§31-35-2, 4 and 5 (lawsuits by policyholders)
were combined into the current §31A-15-102(4), 107 and 108. T h e purpose of the newly
combined act is "to subject unauthorized insurers... to the jurisdiction of the U t a h
c o m m i s s i o n e r and the courts." Utah Code A n n . §31 A-1 5-101(2)(emphasis added).
2.

T h e 1985 act repealed the prior treatment of contracts by
u n a u t h o r i z e d insurers.
T h e immediate ancestor of the current §31A-15-105 was §31-38-3(3)(a) which read,
"The failure of an insurer transacting insurance business in this state to obtain a certificate of authority shall
not impair the validity

of any act or contract of such insurer?" §31-38-3(3)(a)(repealed in 1985 and

replaced by §31A-15-105)(emphasis added).
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3.

U t a h C o d e A n n . §31A-15-105 declares contracts by u n a u t h o r i z e d
insurers to b e V O I D A B L E ; all other provisions of the statute flow
from that substantive c h a n g e of law.

"An insurance policy entered into in violation of this chapter is voidable

by the

policyholder..."

Utah C o d e A n n . §31A-15-105 (emphasis added).
U n d e r c o m m o n law, a "voidable contract" is "a contract that can be affirmed or
rejected by o n e of the parties; a contract that is void as to the party wronged, unless that party
elects to treat it as void." Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 350, (8th ed., 2004)(emphasis added).
Utah Code A n n . §31A-15-105 affirms this traditional judicial treatment of voidable contracts.
N o t h i n g in this statute differs from the c o m m o n law treatment of voidable contracts.
D.

T h e statute e n a b l e s an e x p r e s s contract r e m e d y . It d o e s n o t i n v o k e the
policy c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of an "implied right of action" analysis.

[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the Utah courts have never found an
implied private right of action in the Insurance Code. (pp.32-34)].
1.

U t a h C o d e A n n . §31A-15-105 is substantive and expressly
remedial.

It would be difficult to write with plainer meaning than"the policyholder may avoid
the contract. . ." §31A-15-105(2).
2.

A n "implied right of a c t i o n " analysis is u n n e c e s s a r y .

Car Dealers avoid the plain language of §31 A-l5-105(2). They say, "Because the Utah
Insurance Code does n o t expressly provide for any private right of action, only an "implied"
private right, if any, could exist." (Appellants' Brief, p. 32). They cite (Appellants' Brief, p p .
32-33) three Utah insurance cases to prove, "in the absence of statutory language expressly
indicating a legislative intent to grant a private right of action, Utah courts are reluctant to
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recognize an implied right." Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342, 348
(Utah 2005). The other two cases are Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P. 3d 428, 436 (Utah
2006) and Cannon v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 994 P.2d 824,828-29 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
These three cases do not apply because for the following reasons:
a. An "implied right analysis" is a search for a tort remedy in a statute. Policyholders
are not doing that.
b. An "implied right analysis" does not apply to a plain remedy.
Machan and Cannon (Saleh follows Machan) searched for an "implied right" only
because the plain language of the insurance claims practices statute does not give any right to
the policyholder. Machan, at 116 P.3d 348; Cannon, at 994 P.2d 828. In fact, the code
section applied in both cases states "this section does not create any private cause of action."
Utah Code Ann. §31A-26-303(5)(1999); Machan at 116 P.3d 348, Cannon at 994 P.2d 828.
As the trial court noted, "the cases cited appear to be focused on other portions of the
Insurance Code that are not the basis of the plaintiffs' claims in this case. In reviewing the
motion to dismiss, the Court must look to the section of the Utah Insurance Code that is the
basis of the plaintiffs' claims..." July 30, 2008 Order on Ruling on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft and Gap Insurance Policies, % 22,
emphasis added. The plain words of §31 A-l 5-105(2) give the policyholder an express
remedy: "an insurance policy. . .is voidable by the policyholder. . .the policyholder may avoid
the contract."
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If the Car Dealers applied the four-part "Cort test" used by the Machan court in their
search for an implied right, they would concede the express language of §31A-15-105(2)
easily passes the test.
3.

Even without a private right of action, the court should enforce
§31A-15-105.

"Even in the absence of a private right of action under section 31A-26-301, we would deem it proper
for a court to take into account the legislature s mandates..." Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
116 P.3d at 349, emphasis added.
E.

COURT JURISDICTION: SEVEN REASONS UTAH COURTS
HAVE JURISDICTION A N D POWER TO E N F O R C E §31A-15-105.

[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the
power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the
insurance commissioner" and the policy holders have failed to exhaust their administrative
remedy. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 23, 24, 25, 27, 30—35, quote from p. 23)].
Reason 1:

Court jurisdiction is presumed.

"The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not
excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann.
§78A-5-102(l). "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs." Utah
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.
The legislature's choice of forum in §31a-l 5-105 is not determined by the absence of
the word "court," but by the absence of plain language to the contrary.
Reason 2:

The plain language of the statute describes court action.
32
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To support their view that "the Insurance Code does not authorize courts to
determine Insurance Code violations" (Appellants' Brief, p. 24), the Car Dealers look
everywhere in the Insurance Code except in the statute itself.
The Car Dealers' begin with a faulty premise: "The power of enforcement for any
alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the Insurance Commissioner," a
conclusion they reach from reading the "whole Insurance Code" to avoid being misled by
§31A-15-105(2). (Appellants' Brief, pp. 24, 27).
The "best evidence" of the meaning of a statute is the plain language of the statute
itself. Tcnsen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). Utah Code
Ann. §31 A-15-105 has three parts. The court should harmonize "provisions within the same
statute." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Company, 70 P.3d 1, 8 (Utah 2003). The avoidance remedy belongs to the policyholder, not to the Commissioner or
to the courts. "The policyholder may avoid the contract by notice to the insured." Utah
Code Ann. §31A-15-105(2). If the insurer refuses to return the consideration, court
enforcement is implied. The insurance commissioner has no statutory role in insurance
contract disputes.
Sub-part (1) describes court enforcement. "An insurance contract entered into in
violation of this chapter is unenforceable by, but enforceable against, the insurer. In an
action against the insurer on the contract. . ." Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105(1).
Sub-part (2) implies court enforcement. The plain language of §31 A-15-105(2)
states "The policyholder may avoid the contract. . ." implies the traditional forum for contract
litigation — the courts.
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Subpart (3) d e s c r i b e s court e n f o r c e m e n t . Utah Code A n n . §31 A-l5-105(3) makes
a person w h o assisted an unlicensed insurer "liable to the insured for the. . .claim or loss. . . .if
the insurer does n o t pay it." A court appointed receiver can assert the claims of insureds in a
delinquency action against insolvent insurers under chapter 27a (formerly 27) of the
Insurance Code.
A delinquency action (liquidation of an insurer) is n o t an administrative remedy - it is
a court action.
R e a s o n 3:

T h e I n s u r a n c e C o d e expressly subjects u n l i c e n s e d insurers to
court jurisdiction and appoints the C o m m i s s i o n e r to receive
process.

[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the
p o w e r of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the
insurance commissioner,"and "Appellees have failed to cite any express statutory authority
permitting them to bring such claims."(Brief, pp. 23 and 33.)].
a.

I n v o k i n g court jurisdiction over u n l i c e n s e d insurers is an e x p r e s s
p u r p o s e of the chapter at i s s u e .

T h e purpose of chapter 15 of the Insurance Code, which includes the section u p o n
which these Policyholders rely, is to subject unauthorized insurers "to the jurisdiction of the Utah
commissioner and courts."

Utah Code A n n . §31A-15-101 (1985). (Emphasis added by the trial

court in A d d e n d u m A page 13, *\ 23, the O r d e r from which this appeal is taken.)
b.

Court jurisdiction over u n l i c e n s e d insurers is specifically w i t h i n the
s c o p e of the I n s u r a n c e C o d e .

Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-105 in Part 1, " T h e Purposes, Scope and Application," of the
Insurance C o d e states that any person w h o assists an unauthorized insurer in ways prohibited
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by §31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h), as is alleged by the Policyholders in this case, is "subject to
the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the courts of this state under Sections 31A-2-309
31A-2-310

and

to the extent of that coverage or activity." (emphasis added). T h e last two referenced

sections provide for civil process on unauthorized insurers.
c.

T h e C o m m i s s i o n e r is t h e s t a t u t o r y a g e n t for p r i v a t e l a w s u i t s a g a i n s t
unauthorized insurers.

Court jurisdiction over unauthorized insurers and anyone assisting them is enabled by
appointing "the commissioner or the lieutenant governor as agent for service of process
under jf31A-2-309 and J31A-2-310." Utah C o d e A n n . J31A-15-102(4). T h e same
appointment is made by reference in Utah Code A n n . §31A-1-105.
Subsection 31 A-2-309(l) appoints the Commissioner as the agent for the defendant,
"or the lieutenant governor w h e n the subject proceeding is brought by the state."
If the Commissioner is the only possible plaintiff, as the Car Dealers' argue,
(Appellants' brief, p . 30) why would the legislature designate the commissioner as the
statutory agent for the defendant?

Reason 4:

In Surety U n d e r w r i t e r s , the U t a h S u p r e m e Court a p p l i e d
§31A-15-105 as s u b s t a n t i v e l a w in a c o n t r a c t d i s p u t e .

[Response to the Car Dealers' incorrect statement that the "district court acknowledged its
ruling was thinly supported" and "the Court admitted it had "misapplied" the analysis of
Surety Underwriters."(Appellants' Brief, p p . 25 and 26)].
T h e Car Dealers' argument that §31A-15-105 establishes "a limited right m e a n t to be
enforced through the insurance d e p a r t m e n t " is contrary to the Supreme Court's application
of the statute in Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000).
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There, Certified Surety G r o u p , an insurance company licensed in California, had paid claims
on a surety b o n d covering defendants' trucking business. Certified, o n e of the plaintiffs, sued
to collect on defendants' indemnity agreement signed in connection with the surety b o n d .
T h e defendants raised §31 A - l 5-105(1) as an affirmative defense, arguing that the indemnity
agreement was part of an insurance arrangement and that the insurance contract was
unenforceable under the statute. T h e trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment
because Certified was n o t licensed as an insurer in Utah. T h e Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court, ruling that §31 A-l5-105(1) m a d e the contracts unenforceable. IcL at 345-46.
Car D e a l e r s ' objection to Surety Underwriters m i s a p p l i e s its h o l d i n g . T h e Car
Dealers in this case argue (at Appellants' Brief, p. 25) the Surety Underwriters opinion was
misapplied by the trial court (in its order denying their motion to dismiss the insurance
claims) because it described the defendants as seeking relief. T h e trial court reasoned, "If an
individual has a right to seek relief from the courts under subsection (1) of Utah Code A n n .
§31A-15-105, it is reasonable that an individual would also be able to seek relief from the
courts under subsection (2) of the statute." (Addendum A, ^ 24, R O A 2160 and 2161). In its
ruling o n the Car Dealers' Motion to Reconsider, the trial court corrected its statement by
noting that the Surety court had n o t applied §31A-15-105 to find a cause of action, b u t to
find a valid affirmative defense. (Addendum B, R O A 2193).
Car Dealers apparently believe §31 A-l5-105(1) should be applied differently to
plaintiffs than to defendants - illegal insurance contracts are "unenforceable by. . .the
insurer" only w h e n the insurer is the plaintiff b u t are fully enforceable by the insurer w h e n

36
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the policyholder files the lawsuit. (Appellants' Brief, p. 25, saying the trial court misapplied
the precedent). Car Dealers do not explain their reasoning.
Car Dealers also argue that the insurance company in Surety Underwriters admitted it
did not have a Utah insurer's license, so the opinion does not apply to this case because the
license is disputed here. (Appellants' Brief, p. 26, fn 1). Policyholders' allegations (Facts, No.
13, 42, 43, 44, 60, 61, 62) are assumed to be true for purposes of reviewing the denial of a
motion to dismiss. Hansen v. Dept. of Fin. Inst,. 858 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App. 1993).
Therefore, Facts 38, 42, 43, 61 and 62, asserting the opinion of the Director of the Life &
Property Division that the insurers of Defendants' policies are not licensed in Utah, are
presumed true. (See Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court.)
Defendants overlook a singular point about Surety Underwriters : the court applied
§31A-15-105(1) as substantive law in a contract dispute without requiring enforcement
through the insurance department.
Reason 5:

Courts must enforce the Insurance Code in contract disputes; the
Insurance Code preserves their jurisdiction to do that.

[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because "the
power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests with the
insurance commissioner,"and "Appellees have failed to cite any express statutory authority
permitting them to bring such claims." (Brief, pp. 23 and 33.)].
a.

The Insurance Commissioner is N O T the sole enforcer of Utah
insurance laws. H e does not have judicial power to decide contract
disputes.
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As the head of an administrative agency, the Utah Insurance Commissioner has only
the power specifically delegated to him by the Legislature. Robinson et al v. State, 20 P.3d
396, 400 (Utah 2001). Because of Utah's separation of powers (Utah Constitution, Article V.
Section 1), the commissioner's power to decide cases and controversies, a judicial power, is
restricted. See judd, v. Drezga, 103 P3d 135, 145 (Utah 2004). We have no need to discern
the boundaries of the commissioner's power to intervene in contract disputes between a
policyholder and an insured because the Insurance Code does not give him that power.
b.

The Insurance Code requires courts to apply its rules in insurance
contract lawsuits as if they were written into the contract.

That Insurance Code is written to "maintain freedom of contract." Utah Code Ann. §
31A-1-102(7). If a dispute arises between parties to an insurance contract, courts must apply
the laws and policy of the Insurance Code in construing the contract. Allen v. Prudential
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 806 (Utah 1992).
This broad duty of the courts to apply the Insurance Code is illustrated by Utah Code
Ann. §31A-21-107, a section which parallels somewhat the remedy sought by the
Policyholders under §31A-15-105. Part of chapter 21 , "Insurance Contracts in General,"
§31AA21-107, is entitled "Contract rights under noncomplying policies." The three part
section makes insurance policies which do not meet the requirements of the Insurance Code
"enforceable against the insurer." §31a-21-107(l). The statute gives the policyholder the right
to compel the insurer to "reform, reissue or amend" the policy to conform to insurance laws.
§31A-21 -107(2) and (3), and it dictates the burden of proof in court actions to reform the
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contract to comply with the law. §31A-21-107(1) and (3). Utah courts are designated and
trusted to apply insurance laws to insurance contract disputes.
F u r t h e r m o r e , the Utah Supreme Court has advocated m o r e development of contract
and equitable remedies in insurance contract disputes. In Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), the court surveyed several Utah cases applying
substantive provisions of the insurance code in insurance contract disputes. IcL at 804-805.
T h e court wrote:
Notwithstanding our deference to legislative policy in this area, we necessarily
retain authority to invalidate insurance provisions that are found contrary to
public policy as expressed in the c o m m o n law of contracts that has n o t been
p r e e m p t e d by legislative enactment. . . .It is n o t clear why (contract rules). . .are
insufficient to protect against overreaching insurers w h e n applied on a
case-by-case basis. . . in this state, we have yet to address and develop fully any
of the existing equitable doctrines available to an aggrieved insured. IcL
c.

Courts apply the i n s u r a n c e c o d e to contract d i s p u t e s e v e n w h e n n o
private right of action is found u n d e r the c o d e .

As discussed at argument VII, 2.D.2 above, the Car Dealers (Appellants' Brief, pp. 3233) rely on three Utah insurance cases Machan v. U N U M Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342,
348 (Utah 2005), Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P. 3d 428, 436 (Utah 2006) and C a n n o n v.
Travelers I n d e m n . Co., 994 P.2d 824,828-29 (Utah Ct. A p p . 2000), which refused to imply
tort-like private rights of action into the claims practices sections of the insurance code
because the code said in those sections the code specifically denied private rights of action.
However, the Machan, Saleh and C a n n o n courts did n o t dismiss the contract claims.
As the Supreme Court in Machan explained, the purposes of the Insurance Code "can be
accomplished as well through a contract cause of action, without the analytical straining
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necessitated by the tort approach." Machan, 116 P.3d 342, 348, quoting Beck v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985). " E v e n in the absence of a private right
of action under section 31A-26-301, we would deem it proper for a court to take into account
the legislature's mandates, as well as the insurance commissioner's regulations." Machan at
349.
R e a s o n 6:

T h e administrative r e m e d i e s s u g g e s t e d by the Car D e a l e r s are n o t
required.

[Response to the Car Dealers arguments that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the
policy holders have failed to exhaust their administrative remedy in §31A-2-201(4) . (Brief,
pp., 30-31)].
a.

" D o y o u have a l i c e n s e ? ' is a y e s or no q u e s t i o n .
administrative p r o c e e d i n g is required.

No

T h e Car Dealers say Utah Code A n n . §31A-2-201(6) requires an administrative
remedy because it "places the question of whether or n o t Appellants were 'unauthorized
insurers' within the sole discretion of the Insurance D e p a r t m e n t , " which alone "possesses the
specialized skills and knowledge" to answer the issue. Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-201(6) is a
general instruction to the commissioner to conduct "investigations of insurance matters."
N o t h i n g says this is an exclusive remedy for a policyholder trying to avoid an insurance
contract with an unauthorized insurer.
"Unauthorized insurer" means unlicensed insurer. Utah Code A n n . §31 A - l - 3 0 1
(163)(a). " D o you have a license?' is a yes or no question. N o investigation is needed.
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Appellant Car Dealers do n o t even claim to be licensed insurers; they are licensed as
"limited lines p r o d u c e r s " (sales agents) for credit insurance. (Statement of Fact N o . 12).
Insurers cannot engage in any business other than insurance. Utah Code A n n . §31A-4-107(2).
As to the other insurers of the Car Dealers policies, the Insurance Code simplifies the
Commissioner's role:
W h e n required for evidence in any legal proceeding, the commissioner shall
furnish a certificate of the authority of any licensee to transact insurance
business in Utah on any particular date. T h e court or other officer shall receive
the certificate of authority in lieu of the commissioner's testimony.
Utah Code A n n . §31A-2-212(2).
F o r the convenience of insurance agents and others w h o want to k n o w whether an
insurer is licensed, the Insurance Commission provides a searchable list on its website at
http://www.insurance.utah.gov/index.html
T h e same information is available by p h o n e : (801) 538-3800. Policyholders provided
a list of insurers to the trial court, and also a letter from the office of the Insurance
Commissioner in support of their allegations. (Statement of Facts N o . 38, 60, 61 and 62).
b.

N o t h i n g in the statute requires the Policyholders to s e e k a
declaratory order from the C o m m i s s i o n e r before a v o i d i n g their
contracts.

Car Dealers argue that Utah Code A n n . §31A-2-201(4)(b) is "an administrative means
to address [Policyholders'] claims" and must be exhausted. (Appellants' Brief, p p . 30-31).
T h e statute is found in a chapter describing the general powers and duties of the
commissioner. It reads:
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O n request of any person w h o would be affected by an order under Subsection
(4)(a), the commissioner may issue a declaratory order to clarify the person's
rights or duties.
Utah Code A n n . §31 A-2-201(4)(b).
Policyholders are n o t subject to regulation by the Insurance D e p a r t m e n t and have no
duties which need to be clarified. N o t h i n g in this section or in §31A-15-105 requires a
Policyholder to request a declaratory order clarifying her rights from the Commissioner
before avoiding the contract. T h e plain language states: " T h e policyholder may avoid the
contract by notice to the insurer..." §31A-15-105(2). Courts will n o t imply an administrative
remedy into a plain and unambiguous statute. H a t t o n - W a r d v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d
1071, 1074 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
c.

N o t h i n g in the statute authorizes the C o m m i s s i o n e r to file this
lawsuit o n behalf of the p o l i c y h o l d e r s .

Car Dealers argue the Policyholders' contract avoidance right is "a limited right m e a n t
to be enforced through the Insurance D e p a r t m e n t " which would "pursue the reimbursement
claim against the violators of the Code in court." (Appellants' Brief, p . 30). In support of
their argument, they quote "the original language of the chapter," the former Utah Code A n n .
§31-38-2(1974)(Repealed 1985).
T h e repealed statute is n o t present authority. N o t h i n g in Utah law gives the Insurance
D e p a r t m e n t standing to pursue contract avoidance claims on behalf of policyholders.
R e a s o n 7:

§31A-15-105 is substantive law and is b i n d i n g on the parties a n d
courts as if its terms w e r e written into the contract.

Utah Code A n n . §31 A - l 5-105 makes contracts voidable by the policyholder. Because
it defines rights between the parties, the statute is substantive law. Washington National Ins.
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Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah App. 1990). Substantive statutory remedies
existing at the time of the contract "became part of the contract." Hanson v. Burris, 46 P.2d
400, 407 (Utah 1935). "The laws of Utah, as then existing. . .formed a part of the contract as
if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike
those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement." IcL at 407, quoting
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535,550 (1866).
The trial court has jurisdiction over pending contract causes of action for rescission.
(See description of those claims at Section A.l above). Even if no "private right of action" is
found, as Car Dealers have argued., §31A-15-105 would still bind the parties in the contract
claims. For all of the reasons above, the policyholders are justified in bringing an action
under §31A-15-105(2).
B.

IN THEIR CHALLENGES TO CLASS CERTIFICATION, CAR DEALERS
FAILED TO "MARSHAL ALL THE RECORD EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS
THE CHALLENGED FINDING" UNDER APPELLATE RULE 24(A)(9).
Car Dealers have asserted and argued their own statement of facts to show the trial

court abused its discretion in its findings in support of class certification under Rule 23 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Car Dealers' arguments at pages 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47,
48,49 of their brief.)
The facts used in a class certification analysis under Rule 23 are those alleged by the
representative plaintiffs which must be taken as true by the trial court. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Tacquclin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). Unless the Car Dealers identify and address the facts
relied on by the trial court, they cannot support their claim. It is not enough when an
Appellant "identifies a number of factors he feels the trial court failed to consider in making
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its factual findings" if he "fails to marshal the evidence supporting the findings he attacks."
State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731/750 (Utah 2003).
The trial court identified the source of the facts it relied on for its opinion, and the
Policyholders have listed eighty-nine of those facts. (Addendum A, Trial Court Order, ^fl8,
ROA 2158)(Statement of Material facts Relied on by the Trial Court). Because Car Dealers
have failed to meet their burden under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, to "first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding," the trial
court's class certification should be affirmed.
C.

T H E TRIAL C O U R T D I D N O T ABUSE ITS D I S C R E T I O N IN
CERTIFYING CLASSES T O RESOLVE T H E D I S P U T E S C O N C E R N I N G
T H E DEALERSHIPS 9 V E H I C L E T H E F T I N S U R A N C E POLICIES, GAP
I N S U R A N C E POLICIES AND DEALERS D O C U M E N T A R Y SERVICE
FEES (DOC FEES).
1.

T h e trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Commonality and
Typicality under Rule 23(a) for the Vehicle Theft Insurance classes.

T h e Rule. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if..., (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class." Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

T h e Policyholders' allegations concerning Vehicle Theft Protection
insurance (VTP).

Both dealerships sell Vehicle Theft policies that promise to pay benefits if the car
stolen.
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E d g e -Guard p o l i c i e s . Midway Auto Pla2a and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi both sell an
insurance policy they call "Edge-guard" which insures the car owner against the risk of theft
of the car.
Using acid, the car dealers etch small numbers o n the windows of every car in their
inventory before the purchaser comes onto the lot. If the car buyer pays a premium of
$299.95 for the guarantee policy, the etched n u m b e r is registered with a database at an
undisclosed location, and the car buyer is given a "warranty policy."(Statement of Facts N o .
17 and 18). A copy of the Edge-guard policy is attached as A d d e n d u m F, R O A 1684. (No
other version of the policy appears to have been used.)
T h e policy promises a "$2,500 & $5,000 Benefit Recovery G u a r a n t e e " if the car is
stolen. T h e parties to the contract are the policyholder and the car dealer, w h o signs as
" D e a l e r - R e p " and "Seller." Benefits are paid by " T h e E D G E program administrator," which
apparently receives reimbursement for its losses from an unidentified insurance company.
(Statement of Facts N o . 19, 20, 28). T h e policyholder is n o t in privity with any insurance
company, and the policy states "this is n o t a policy of insurance." (Addendum F).
Although the policy seems to promise an "Anti-Theft $2500 & $5000 Benefit
Recovery Guarantee," (Addendum F, see large, bold print above first paragraph), the body of
the paragraph seems to promise only "a discount allowance toward the purchase of a new
vehicle" or "reimbursement up to $1000.00 of the primary insurance deductible" depending
u p o n w h e t h e r the stolen car is recovered or n o t recovered.
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Named Plaintiff Severo Rodriguez bought an Edge-Guard policy from Midway Auto
Plaza on June 1, 2004, and named Plaintiff Nicholas Rodarte bought an Edge-Guard policy
from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi on May 22, 2004. (Statement of Facts No. 21 and 22).
Midway Auto sold more than 1500 Vehicle Theft policies from 2000 through 2006;
Mike Riddle Mitsubishi sold more than 1,150 Vehicle Theft policies from 2004 through 2006.
(Statement of Facts No. 39 and 40). More recent sales number are not available.
Specific complaints about Edge-guard policies. The Edge-Guard theft policy is
an illusory contract which is so vague that its promises are incomprehensible. (Addendum F,
first full paragraph, ROA 1684). Questions about what the benefit is and what the
policyholder must do to get the $2,500 or $5,000 benefit are unanswerable.
VTP policies. Midway Auto Plaza sold a product called "VTP" in the years 2001
through 2003. This "warranty policy" promised "up to $1,500" if the car was stolen and not
recovered. Only the policyholder and the car dealer signed the policies. The promise to pay
benefits is from a company called "VTP" and "VTP Vehicle Theft Protection," which is an
unregistered d.b.a. of "Competitive Dealer Services," an unregistered d.b.a. of Michelle
Davis of Bountiful, Utah. (Statement of Facts No. 29). (Addendum 1686, see promise in ^
9, "VTP will pay the registered owner...", ROA 1686 and reverse side).
Plaintiff Dalton Jaques purchased a VTP policy for $3,500 from Midway Auto Plaza
on August 9, 2004. (Statement of Facts No. 32). The usual premium for VTP was $299.95.
(ROA 194).
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Policyholders' complaints about Edge-guard and VTP policies. In the trial
court, the Car Dealers denied their vehicle theft policies were insurance contracts. They
appear to admit this allegation for the first time on appeal. (Appellants' Brief, Facts 62-65).
It is puzzling how Car Dealers, who denied they were insurance when they sold them,
now say the policies were in full compliance with insurance laws.
None of the entities listed in the Edge-Guard and VTP policies are licensed insurers
(Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court, No. 38, 41, 42, 43, and 44), in
violation of §31 A-15-101 throughl03. The policies were not approved by the commissioner
and did not meet the statutory requirements for insurance policies (e.g., see §31A-21-301,
"policies must state the exact name and address of the insurer"). The Car Dealer insurance
agents are licensed to sell "limited lines credit insurance" (see definition at §31A-1-301(98)),
but not property insurance like the vehicle theft policies. (Statement of Facts No. 12 and 13).
Their licenses do not authorize them to sell insurance from unlicensed insurers. (§31 A-15103) (Statement of Facts No. 12, 13, 38, 42, 43, 44).
The Vehicle Theft insurance class causes of action. Plaintiffs assert three class
causes of action on the Edge-Guard and VTP policies under the Second Amended Class
Action Complaint :
COUNT 6. Contract avoidance under §31A-15-105. Avoidance of the policies,
discussed above, for class members who elect, after fair notice, to cancel the policy and claim
a refund of the price they paid.
C O U N T 8. Injunctive relief and contract rescission for violation of public policy.
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This count alleges that the Vehicle Theft policies violated public policy as set forth in
the statutes of the states. Specifically: the benefits were n o t promised by licensed insurers
(§31A-15-101-103), the policies were n o t approved by the commissioner and did n o t m e e t
the statutory requirements for insurance policies (see §31A-21-301, "the exact n a m e of the
insurer"), and the selling agents were nor properly licensed to sell insurance from unlicensed
insurers. (Statement of Facts N o . 12, 13, 38, 42, 43, and 44). Plaintiffs seek rescission of the
contracts and restitution of the $299.95 premium for all m e m b e r s of the class w h o so elect
after fair notice (or whatever they paid).
C O U N T 9. Rescission of an illusory contract. U n d e r this count, Plaintiffs seek a
declaration that E d g e - G u a r d theft policy is a vague, incomprehensible and illusory contract
which (see A d d e n d u m F, R O A 1684, first full paragraph) which binds no-one. Plaintiffs seek
rescission of the contracts and restitution of the $299 premium for all m e m b e r s of the class
w h o so elect after fair notice.
3.

For class action certification, Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true.

T h e Car Dealers have included a Statement of Facts which they say contradicts the
Trial Court's ruling. See, for example, their claim that "Appellants' policies are undisputedly
underwritten by qualified insurers." (Appellants Brief, p.62). This contradicts the
Policyholders' principal allegation that n o n e of the benefits promised were to be paid by a
licensed insurer in Utah. (Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court, N o . 12,
13, 38, 42, 43, and 44, supported by a letter from the Utah D e p a r t m e n t of Insurance). T h e
Car Dealers appear to misunderstand the trial court has n o t m a d e factual rulings, but has
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assumed the Policyholders facts to be true for purposes of Rule 23. (Addendum A, Trial
Court Order, | 1 8 , R O A 2158).
In determining whether a class should be certified, the substantive allegations of the
complaint are to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Tacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974)
(Class certification requires an inquiry into whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met
rather than whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits.)
T h e Trial Court's ruling:
T h e plaintiffs have argued that there is one question that applies to all
m e m b e r s of the p r o p o s e d classes: whether the defendants' vehicle theft
policies violate the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are
available. T h e defendants have argued that the plaintiffs' complaint fails to
identify a c o m m o n plan or scheme of wrongdoing, and the factual and legal
questions of the plaintiffs vary according to each individual transaction with
the defendants. Because the circumstances of each transaction may vary, the
defendants argued, there is no commonality and the proposed classes may n o t
be certified.
T h e defendants noted that while all of the proposed class m e m b e r s
purchased vehicle theft policies, the class m e m b e r s did not purchase the same
types of vehicle theft policies, and those products did n o t involve the same
administrator with the same underwriter. T h u s , argue the defendants, a trial for
this case would "devolve into a series of individual trials on issues peculiar to
each plaintiff." Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 166 (D. Kan. 1996).
T h e Court finds that the issues are n o t so complicated as argued by the
defendants. In this case, the primary consideration is whether the defendants
sold the plaintiffs an insurance p r o d u c t at a time w h e n the defendants did n o t
have a license to sell insurance products. It is irrelevant whether these products
had different administrators a n d / o r different underwriters, because the basis of
the claim is n o t that the plaintiffs were given products that were improperly
administered or were not properly supported by underwriters, but instead that
the insurance products were improperly sold and invalid from the beginning.
.... T h e plaintiffs' motions for class certification are all G R A N T E D .
T h e Court does note, however, that the certification of the proposed classes
for claims based on the sale of vehicle theft policies is conditional on the
inclusion of three classes, instead of two.
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A d d e n d u m A, O r d e r on Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle
Theft Policies, fflf 34, 35, 36 and 75, R O A 2164, 2177.
4.

T h e trial court c o n s i d e r e d and properly rejected the Car D e a l e r s '
objections.

In this appeal, the Car Dealers have renewed the same objections addressed by the
trial court.
a.

" C o m m o n Plan or S c h e m e " is n o t the test . Car Dealers again argue that

certification was an abuse of discretion because the Policyholders' "Complaint fails to
adequately plead a c o m m o n plan or c o m m o n scheme of wrongdoing with regard to the sale
of V T P products," and that the Car Dealers "did n o t engage in a c o m m o n plan or scheme
(Appellants' Brief, p. 53). They apparently believe the Policyholders m u s t prove the Car
Dealers acted " u n d e r h a n d e d or shady or even unique from other car dealers." (Appellants'
Brief, p.62).
Rule 23 only requires "questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the class," and that "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class." N o nefarious plan or scheme needs to be proven, and the court did n o t abuse its
discretion in refusing to accept this argument.
b.

Questions of law or fact are c o m m o n to the class. Appellants say " N o Issues

of fact are c o m m o n to all class m e m b e r s . " (Appellants' Brief, p.55).
T h e trial court did n o t abuse its discretion. C o m m o n questions of fact include: 1)
whether class m e m b e r s purchased Vehicle Theft policies from these dealers and 2) whether
the insurers of those policies are licensed to be insurers in the state of Utah. A n o t h e r
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c o m m o n question of fact is whether the policy forms were approved by the Utah
D e p a r t m e n t of Insurance. C o m m o n questions of law include: 1) whether the insurers and
policies comply with Utah insurance law, and 2) whether the policyholders have a legal
remedy for return of their premiums. N o individual question of law or fact is important.
c.

T h e case will n o t require m o r e than 1,700 different trials. (Appellants' Brief,

p p . 55-56). T h e Policyholders allege that every vehicle theft policy sold by these car dealers
violated Utah insurance law because the insureds were n o t licensed by the state of Utah. T h e
trial court separated the inquiry into two classes, one for each policy. Within the classes,
Policyholders allege that every policy used the same form, was sold by the same agent, and
has the same unlicensed insurer. All are invalid for the same reasons.
T h e trial court did n o t abuse its discretion by finding "the issues are n o t so
complicated as argued by the defendants." (Addendum A, f 36, R O A 2164). T h e insurance
issues will likely be decided on summary judgment after additional fact discovery.
5.

T h e trial court did not a b u s e its discretion in finding C o m m o n a l i t y and
Typicality u n d e r Rule 23(a) for the GAP I n s u r a n c e c l a s s e s .

T h e Rule.

" O n e or m o r e m e m b e r s of a class may sue or be sued as representative

parties on behalf of all only if..., (2) there are questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class." Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
T h e P o l i c y h o l d e r s ' allegations c o n c e r n i n g GAP I n s u r a n c e . Both dealerships sell
G A P insurance policies that promise to pay benefits if the car is wrecked.
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Car Dealers may sell GAP credit insurance only from licensed insurers. GAP
insurance is a type of credit insurance. (Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-301(69), and both Car
Dealers have been licensed by the State of Utah as "limited lines insurance producers" to sell
credit insurance, but only from a licensed insurer. Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-102(1).
GAP insurance policies. When a car is totaled, Guaranteed Automobile Protection
(GAP) insurance will pay the remaining balance of the car loan (the "gap") after the owner's
comprehensive insurance coverage has paid. (Statement of Facts No. 45).
As sold by most commercial lenders, GAP insurance is a three party agreement in
which the debtor purchases insurance underwritten by a commercial insurance company to
pay the loan if the car is destroyed. (Statement of Facts No. 47).
Both Car Dealers sell a modified version of GAP often referred to as a "waiver
GAP." (Statement of Facts No. 49). GAP waivers are two-party insurance contracts
between the dealer and the car buyer in which the separate insurance premium, usually
between $500 and $600, buys forgiveness (waiver) of the balance owed under the installment
sales contract if the car is destroyed. (Statement of Facts No. 50 and 52). The Car Dealers'
insurance policy is an addendum to the installment sales contract. (Statement of Facts No. 53;
See Addendum I and J for sample GAP policies OwnerGuard and AHIS, ROA 1764, 1765).
The Car Dealers admit these are insurance policies. (Appellants Brief, Facts 67, 69).
In all of their GAP waiver policies except Beacon GAP, the Car Dealers assume the
risk of the loss of the car as the principal in the insurance contract. In the Beacon GAP
policies, a foreign business called Beacon Industries Worldwide, Inc. ("Beacon") assumes the
risk of the loss of the car in the contract. (Statement of Facts No. 54; See Addendum H for a
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sample Beacon GAP policy, ROA 1760-1762). In the view of the Utah Department of
Insurance, these Car Dealers are acting as the insurers in their policies, are not licenced as
insurers.
The Car Dealers' GAP policies are written and sold to the Car Dealers by agents for
foreign companies who act as GAP "administrators" to receive claims and decide whether
the dealer should accept or deny them. (Statement of Facts No. 56). If the "administrator"
accepts the claim, the Dealer or its successor waives the balance owed on the installment sales
contract after payment from the car owner's collision insurance. (Statement of Facts No. 57).
Midway Auto Plaza sold more than 1,500 GAP policies after opening in 2000; 328 of
these policies were from Beacon. Mike Riddle Mitsubishi sold more than 1,140 GAP policies
after opening in 2004; 346 of these policies were from Beacon. (Statement of Facts No. 58
and 59).
The Common complaint about these Car Dealers' GAP policies. As the
contracting party assuming the risk, the Car Dealers become the insurers in their GAP
contracts. (See Statement of Material Facts Relied on by the Trial Court, 60-63; August 17,
2007 letter from Utah Department of Insurance, Addendum D second letter, ROA 17411742).1 The Car Dealers and Beacon are not licensed as insurers in Utah. (Statement of Facts

1

Utah law defines an insurer as, "any person doing an insurance business as a principal."
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1 -301 (87)(a)(i). "An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and
the insured..." Miller v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 44 P.3d 663, 676 (Utah 2002).
"An insurer is the party to a contract of insurance who assumes the risk and undertakes to
indemnify the insured, or pay a certain sum on the happening of a specified contingency." Couch
on Insurance, § 39:1 (2004).
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60-63). See Utah Code A n n . §31A-4-107(2). Insurers cannot operate any business other than
an insurance company.
T h e class action c a u s e s of action for GAP i n s u r a n c e . T h e Policyholders Second
A m e n d e d Class Action Complaint seeks the relief described in Counts 10, 12 and 13.
1).

C O U N T 10. Contract avoidance under §31A-15-105. Because the Car Dealers

and Beacon were not licensed as insurers, all sales of the Car Dealers' G A P policies violate
the Utah Insurance Code, as discussed above. Policyholders seek a declaration that the
practice is illegal, injunctive relief and avoidance of the contract for all m e m b e r s of the class
w h o elect, after fair notice, to avoid the policy and claim a refund.
2).

C O U N T 12. Injunctive relief and contract rescission for violation of public

policy. Policyholders seek a declaration that the practice is illegal, injunctive relief and
rescission of all D e f e n d a n t s ' G A P insurance contracts for class m e m b e r s w h o elect, after
notice, to cancel the policy and claim a refund.
3).

C O U N T 13. Rescission of an illusory contract. Policyholders seek a

declaration that the Beacon G A P policies are illusory. In the policies, Beacon Industries
Worldwide, Inc. agrees to waive all sums owed under the installment sales agreement between
the car buyer and the car dealer. Beacon holds no interest in the installment sales contract, so
its promise to waive the debt is meaningless and is illusory.
Policyholders also seek injunctive relief prohibiting the sale of these policies, and the
remedy of rescission of the Beacon G A P insurance contracts for class m e m b e r s w h o elect,
after fair notice, to cancel the policy and claim a refund.
Summary: N o n e of these Car D e a l e r s ' insurance p o l i c i e s are legal in U t a h .
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These Car Dealers search for legitimacy in their claim "products like these ... are
c o m m o n in the industry. . ." (Appellants' Brief, alleged fact 12, See also, fact 67). W h a t they
mean is that m o s t car dealers sell vehicle theft insurance and G A P insurance. W h a t they do not
mean is that m o s t car dealers sell these policies. None of the policies sold by these car dealers are legal
in Utah.
For class action certification, Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true. In
determining whether a class should be certified, the substantive allegations of the complaint
are to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, supra.
T h e Trial Court's ruling.
T h e plaintiffs have argued that the claims of the m e m b e r s of the
proposed classes related to the G A P insurance policies are c o m m o n , because
there is one question to be answered: do the defendants' G A P policies violate
the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are available to the
m e m b e r s of the class? T h e plaintiffs did note that there were several insurers
involved, including Midway, Beacon, and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi, and the
products were sold by b o t h Midway and Mike Riddle Mitsubishi.
T h e defendants raised an argument similar to the argument they raised
in the m e m o r a n d u m in opposition for the m o t i o n to certify classes re: vehicle
theft policies. T h e defendants argued that the p r o p o s e d class m e m b e r s
purchase different types of G A P insurance, with different administrators, with
different underwriters, and different policy forms. Because of these differences,
the defendants argued that the commonality requirement has n o t been met.
... Taking the plaintiffs' argument as true and correct, there would be
only two classes, and each individual would have a c o m m o n claim: that he or
she purchased an invalid insurance policy from one of the defendant
dealerships. It does n o t appear that it matters w h o the administrator or
underwriter was, because the basis of the claim is n o t that there was no proper
insurer involved at any point, but rather that the individual purchasers did n o t
have privity of contract with a proper insurer. Instead, the individual
purchasers only had privity of contract with one of the defendants, and the
contract between the parties was invalid because the defendant dealerships
were n o t licensed to sell insurance products.
T h e Court therefore finds that the proposed classes related to G A P insurance policies
have satisfied the commonality requirement.
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A d d e n d u m A, O r d e r on Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle
Theft Policies, ffl[ 39 through 4 3 , R O A 2165-2167.
T h e trial court c o n s i d e r e d and properly rejected the Car D e a l e r s ' o b j e c t i o n s .
Policyholders allege that n o n e of these Car Dealers' insurance policies are legal in Utah, so
variations in the manner of sale do n o t matter.
Car Dealers have renewed the same objections addressed by the trial court.
a.

" C o m m o n Plan or S c h e m e " is n o t the test. Car Dealers again argue they "did

n o t engage in a c o m m o n plan or scheme (Appellants' Brief, p. 61-62). They apparently
believe the Policyholders m u s t prove the Car Dealers acted " u n d e r h a n d e d or shady or even
unique from other car dealers." (Appellants' Brief, p.62).
Rule 23 only requires "questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the class," and that "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class." N o nefarious plan or scheme needs to be proven, and the court did n o t abuse its
discretion in refusing to accept this argument.
b.

.

-

Questions of law or fact are c o m m o n to the class. Appellants say " N o Issues

of fact are c o m m o n to all class m e m b e r s . " (Appellants' Brief, p.63).
T h e trial court did n o t abuse its discretion. C o m m o n questions of fact include: 1)
whether class m e m b e r s purchased G A P insurance policies from these dealers and 2) whether
the car dealers, or Beacon Industries are licensed to act as insurers of those policies. T h e Car
Dealers do n o t claim to be licensed insurers - insurers in Utah cannot also run another
business such as a car dealership. Utah Code A n n . §31A-4-107(2). Neither do they claim
Beacon was a licensed insurer.
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Because Policyholders allege all of Car Dealers' insurance policies violate the same
Utah laws for the same reason, the legal issues are the same across the class.
c.

Will not require more than 2,600 different trials. (Appellants' Brief, p.64). The

Policyholders allege that every GAP policy sold by these dealers violated Utah insurance law
because the insureds were not licensed in Utah. Although the policy forms differed, all are
invalid for the same reasons. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by finding:
each individual would have a common claim: that he or she purchased an
invalid insurance policy from one of the defendant dealerships. It does not
appear that it matters who the administrator or underwriter was, because the
basis of the claim is not that there was no proper insurer involved at any point,
but rather that the individual purchasers did not have privity of contract with a
proper insurer.
Addendum A, Trial court order, f 42, ROA 2166-2167.
This is reasonable in light of the claims asserted. The Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying the GAP claims.
6.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Commonality and
Typicality under Rule 23(a) for the Dealer Documentary Service Fees
(Doc Fees) classes.

The Rule. "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if..., (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class." Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Policyholders' allegations concerning Dealer Documentary Service Fees (Doc
Fees). Both dealerships charge the same Dealer Documentary Service Fees (Doc Fee).
a.

Summary: Defendants have violated every Utah law governing
Documentary Fees.
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The charging of Doc Fees by car dealers is regulated in Utah by statute and
administrative rules from the Motor Vehicle Enforcement division of the Utah Tax
Commission. These Car Dealers and most other car dealers in the state charge Doc Fees for
preparing and processing documents and registering and titling the vehicle in the name of the
buyer. Car Buyers complain that the Car Dealers have violated every applicable state statute
and regulation.
b.

Defendants have violated the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation
Act and regulations. (Count 2 of Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action
Complaint.)

The Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act, Utah Code §41-3-1 et seq., was
enacted to protect purchasers and lessees of motor vehicles in Utah through uniform rules
and regulations and licensing requirements for motor vehicle sellers.
These regulations were adopted under authority of the Motor Vehicle Business
Regulation Act and given the force of law in Utah Code §41-3-210(c)and(d).
c.

Advertising and Selling Violations

In charging a Doc Fee, the Car Dealers have violated the Dealer License Holder
Prohibitions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Business Regulation Act, Utah Code §41-3-1 et. seq.,
especially §41-3-201(1)(a) which prohibits misleading or inaccurate advertising by dealers.
Plaintiffs are complaining about the written offers of sale, sometimes called "pencils,
which were given to and accepted by all class members. (Statement of Facts No. 70, 71, 72,
and 73). These written offers are "advertisements" under Utah law, and they did not include
the doc fees. (Statement of Facts No. 76). "Advertisement" means: any written, oral, or
graphic statement or representation made by a supplier in connection with the solicitation of
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business... It does not include any oral, in person, representation made by a sales
representative to a prospective purchaser." Utah Code Ann. §13-11 a-2.
The Car Dealers violated this specific regulation under the Utah Motor Vehicle
Business Regulation Act, which by its own terms applies to more than just public advertising:
A violation of any of the following standards of practice for the advertising and
selling of motor vehicles is a violation of Section 41-3-210:
2. Bait. Bait advertising and selling practices may not be used. A vehicle
advertised at a specific price. . .shall be willingly shown, demonstrated and
sold. . .at the advertised price and terms. . . .
3. Price. When the price of a vehicle is quoted. . .the stated price must
include all charges that the customer must pay for the vehicle, including
freight or destination charges, dealer preparation, dealer handling, additional
dealer profit, document fees, and undercoating or rustproofing.
Utah Administrative Code, Rule R877-23V-7 (emphasis added) .
The Car Dealers violate this rule every time they quote the price of a vehicle in a
written offer and give it to a consumer without including the $399.95 Doc Fee in the price.
Each violation of Rule R877-23V-7 by Defendants is a criminal act by virtue of Utah Code
§41-3-701, and subjects the Car Dealers to civil sanctions, including the right of a purchaser
to maintain a civil action, under Utah Code Ann. §§41-3-404(l)(iii) and 41-3-702.
d.

Violation of Regulatory Rule Requiring Special Segregation of
Dealer Documentary Fees in Motor Vehicle Contracts

In charging a Doc Fee, the Car Dealers have violated Administrative Rule R877-23V14 of the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division of the Utah Tax Commission. That rule,
which has the force of a statutory violation under Utah Code §41-3-1 et. seq., esp. §41-3201(l)(c), requires these car dealers to "segregate and separately identify the fees required by
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Title 41, Chapter la, as state-mandated fees. . . .A dealer that fails to segregate and separately
identify state-mandated fees. . .is in violation of Title 41, Chapter 3." The "state-mandated"
fees are taxes and license fees the dealer must collect to issue a temporary permit for the car.
The Car Dealers have violated this rule in every contract of sale. (Addendum K
sample sales contract of Severo Rodriguez, ROA 1984). They do not "segregate and
identify" state mandated fees. The placement of the Documentary Fees on line 27 is just two
lines below the "State Waste Tire Recycling Fee," which is immediately below the "State
Inspections/Emissions Test," making it difficult to tell which charges are state mandated and
which are not, such as dealer doc fees.
e. Violation of the Regulatory Rule Requiring Special Prominent Sign as a
Condition for Charging a Dealer Documentary Service Fee
Rule R877-23V-14 also requires car dealers who charge doc fees to "prominently
display a sign on the dealer premises in such location as to readily discernable by all
purchasers, consumers, or lessees." IcL (emphasis added). The language of the sign is
given in the rule. The Car Dealers claim to have small signs which meet the rule in their
finance offices, where consumers are not invited until after they agree to purchase a car, but
the Car Buyers allege they are not "prominently" displayed "in such location as to be readily
discernable by all purchasers, consumers, or lessees," because 1) their location means
customers do not see them until after they have already struck the deal to buy the car, 2)
other customers, "Consumers," never see them, and 3) the 5" x 6" or 6" x 6" signs are too
small.
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Until the Car Dealers prominently display their required signs in locations where all
consumers can readily discern them and consider them while negotiating to buy a car, they
are violating the law.
Plaintiffs are seeking judgment for a refund of the Doc Fees paid by all members of
the class, in addition to injunctive relief mandating compliance with the law.
f.

Defendants' common scheme of charging Documentary Fees is in
breach of the U.C.C. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

After a consumer and the dealer negotiate the price of a car, the consumer accepts the
dealers offer by signing the "pencil" on the back of the proposal worksheet. (Addendum L
sample worksheet or pencil, ROA 1921). If a consumer and the dealer negotiate a sale of a
car for $12,000 plus tax and licence, for example, the deal is struck. "The obligation of the
seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with
the contract." Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-301. The car buyer anticipates a more formal
contract, consistent with the negotiated terms. When the dealer refuses to sell the car without
additional profit through a $399.95 Doc Fee, the dealer is acting in bad faith. For the dealer,
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance
or enforcement." Utah Code Ann. §70A-l-203.
The proper remedy for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
rescission of the contract. Plaintiffs are seeking that remedy and injunctive relief.
g.

Car Dealers have violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act. (Count 1 of
Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action Complaint.)
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T h e Utah Unfair Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-1-1, et. seq., makes it unlawful for
the Car Dealers to receive or accept compensation which exceeds the actual cost to them for
services rendered in connection with the sale of goods. Utah Code Annotated, §13-5-3 (3).
D e f e n d a n t s ' charges of $249.00 to $399.95 during the class period are excessive and
are mostly additional profit to the dealership. (Statement of Facts N o . 63).
Further, by charging D o c Fees to Policyholders and Class M e m b e r s , the Car Dealers
have engaged in unfair m e t h o d s of competition which are unlawful under Utah Code Ann.
§13-5-2.5 (1). Unfair m e t h o d s of competition are described by the rules and regulations cited
above, and by Utah Code Ann. §13-5-8 which reads, "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in business within the state to advertise goods, wares, or merchandise that person is
n o t prepared to supply." T h e Car Dealers are n o t prepared to supply the car unless an
additional doc fee is paid. Contracts in violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act are illegal
and void, and Car Buyers are entitled to injunctive relief and damages (return of the doc fee).
Utah Code Ann., §§13-5-13 and 14.
h.

D e f e n d a n t s c h a r g e s for D o c u m e n t a r y F e e s s h o u l d b e r e s c i n d e d as b e i n g
illegal and in violation of p u b l i c p o l i c y (Count 4 of Plaintiffs Second
A m e n d e d Class Action Complaint).

This cause of action seeks the c o m m o n law remedy of rescission for the conduct
described above for the following additional reasons.
Violation of the U t a h M o t o r V e h i c l e Act. By requiring car buyers to pay doc fees
for registering the car, the Dealers deprive car buyers of the benefit of their statutory right to
register the car themselves under the Utah M o t o r Vehicle Act, Utah C o d e A n n § 4 1 - l a - 1 0 1 ,
et. seq., especially §41-la-209.
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T h e Car D e a l e r s violate the U t a h Truth in Advertising Act. T h e Car Dealers
have violated Utah Code A n n §13-1 la-1 by changing the terms of the sale after making
written offers and agreeing to sell the car at a price which did n o t include the doc fees.
(Statement of Facts 7 1 , 72, 73, 74 and 75).
i.

Car D e a l e r s are unjustly e n r i c h e d by their collection of D o c u m e n t a r y
F e e s . (Count 5 of Plaintiffs Second A m e n d e d Class Action Complaint).

F o r the reasons described above, equity demands restitution of the wrongly collected
D o c u m e n t a r y Fees.
For class action certification, Car B u y e r s ' allegations are taken as true.

In

determining whether a class should be certified, the substantive allegations of the complaint
are to be taken as true. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,- 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974)(Class
certification requires an inquiry into whether the requirements of Rule 23 are m e t rather than
whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits).
T h e Trial Court's ruling certifying the D o c F e e s claims:
T h e plaintiffs' claims related to dealer documentary service fees are
based on the allegations that each m e m b e r of the proposed class paid a dealer
documentary service fee, b u t that the fee was charged in addition to the
advertised price, the fee was mostly profit to the dealer, the defendants failed
to post signs informing customers about the fee, and the fees were n o t
specifically segregated in the m o t o r vehicle contracts (thus implying that it was
a state-mandated fee).
T h e defendants again argued that there is insufficient commonality
between the claims of the m e m b e r s of the p r o p o s e d class, because the a m o u n t
of the documentary fees changed over time, and the actual profit collected by
the dealers was different for each transaction, because each transaction
involved different amounts of paperwork. T h e defendants noted that the issue
of whether the sign was posted would require each m e m b e r of the p r o p o s e d
class to answer questions about matters such as where the contracts were
signed, and whether the individual saw any signs informing them of the dealer
fees. T h e issue of whether the fees were part of the advertised price would
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require individual questioning of w h o the salesperson or manager was, whether
the customer signed the "worksheet," and whether the "pencil" made any
m e n t i o n of documentary fees. T h e issue of whether the salesperson a n d / o r
contract implied that the documentary fee was state-mandated would require
individual questioning about w h a t the contract looked like, w h e t h e r the
customer read the contract, and what statements were made by the salesperson.
T h e plaintiff noted in response that the evidence does and will show
that transactions between prospective purchasers and the defendant
dealerships followed the same process, the dealerships used almost identical
forms, the sales process takes place in the same area of the dealerships, that the
documentary fee was never discussed between the salesperson and the buyer,
and that it is clear that in b o t h dealerships the sign about the fee was posted in
a location where it could n o t be seen by customers, b u t could only be seen
after the customer had decided to purchase a car and entered the finance
office.
T h e plaintiffs have requested o n e remedy for the defendants' alleged
violations: a return of all dealer documentary service fees charged to m e m b e r s
of the p r o p o s e d classes. It appears that this remedy is based on one key
question: did the defendants' actions violate the law and thus render the
documentary fee provisions of the sales contract invalid? T h a t question is
c o m m o n to all m e m b e r s of the p r o p o s e d classes. T h e individualized inquiry
described by the defendants is n o t necessary and the m e m b e r s of the p r o p o s e d
classes related to dealer documentary service fees have m e t the commonality
requirement.
A d d e n d u m A, O r d e r o n Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle
Theft Policies, f f 44 through 47, R O A 2167-2168.
T h e trial court c o n s i d e r e d and properly rejected the Car D e a l e r s ' o b j e c t i o n s .
In this appeal, the Car Dealers have renewed their objections in the trial court.
a. " C o m m o n Plan or S c h e m e " is n o t the test. Car Dealers again argue
they"did n o t engage in a c o m m o n plan or scheme (Appellants' Brief, p. 40-41). They
apparently believe the Policyholders must prove the Car Dealers acted " u n d e r h a n d e d or
shady or even unique from other car dealers." (Appellants' Brief, p.62).
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Rule 23 only requires "questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the class," and that "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class." T h e court did n o t abuse its discretion in refusing to accept this argument.
b.

Material facts d o not vary w i t h e a c h individual transaction.

(Appellants'Brief, p.63).
T h e trial court did n o t abuse its discretion in this.
T h e plaintiff noted in response that the evidence does
and will show that transactions between prospective purchasers
and the defendant dealerships followed the same process, the
dealerships used almost identical forms, the sales process takes
place in the same area of the dealerships, that the documentary
fee was never discussed between the salesperson and the buyer,
and that it is clear that in b o t h dealerships the sign about the fee
was posted in a location where it could n o t be seen by
customers, b u t could only be seen after the customer had
decided to purchase a car and entered the finance office.
T h e plaintiffs have requested one remedy for the
defendants' alleged violations.
A d d e n d u m A, Trial Court Order, | | 46 and 47, R O A 2168.
This view of the trial court is reasonable.
7.

T h e trial court did not a b u s e its discretion in finding the class
representatives to b e a d e q u a t e under Rule 23(a) for the all three class
actions.
T h e Law.
Utah Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(4) requires only that"the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
T h e trial court c o n s i d e r e d and properly rejected the Car D e a l e r s ' o b j e c t i o n s .
T h e Car Dealers raise again the same arguments trial court carefully considered and rejected.
a.

T h e trial court c o n s i d e r e d the full c o n t e x t of the t e s t i m o n y ; Car
D e a l e r s o m i t the c o n t e x t here.
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Car Dealers argue without support from the record, "several of the n a m e d Appellees,
such as J o d i Poll Hollbrook and Gregory Heiner, affirmatively state they have n o objection to
Appellees' practice of charging D o c Fees." (Appellants Brief, p. 47.) T h e trial court
considered the full context of the testimony of the class representatives. J o d i H o l b o o k said
only that she did n o t object to the doc fees at the time of the sale, and Gregory Heiner does n o t
object to "a dealer" charging a "reasonable and customary" documentary fee. ( R O A 13261328, 1330-1332, Reply M e m o r a n d u m in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of
Class Re: Dealer D o c u m e n t a r y Service Fee Exhibits K and L).
Car Dealers n o w argue without support from the record that D a l t o n Jaques, Elisha
Dela Garza and Nicholas Rodarte are "only interested in their o w n claims."

(Appellants

Brief, p p . 47, 48, 58, 66, 67.) These characterizations are out of context. Mr. Jaques
testimony, for example, said the opposite, yet Car Dealers unreasonably isolate the last " n o "
in his testimony:
Q
W o u l d it be fair to say that that's really all you're concerned about,
are your claims?
A
No.
Q
You're concerned about others?
A
Yeah.
Q
But you'll let the others prosecute their o w n claims?
A
I don't understand what you mean. Can I
prosecute other peoples' claims?
Q
Is that w h a t you're intending to do?
A No.
Deposition of D a l t o n Jaques, R O A 1455, — Exhibit P to same reply m e m o above.).
T h e trial court had a better opportunity to consider the full context of these and other
objections by the Car Dealers, and has wide discretion in certification issues.
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b. The trial court correctly applied the law.
The court noted:
...it appears that the test for determining whether an individual can be a proper
class representative is not a stringent one. It does not appear that a proposed
class representative is required to understand the case and the legal theories of
the case. Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D. Utah 1998)
(internal citations omitted). Instead, the primary test is whether counsel for the
proposed class representative is qualified to litigate the case, and whether the
class representative has interests antagonistic to the class. Id. (Internal citation
omitted).
Addendum A, Trial Court Order, f 53, ROA 2171.
Both parties agree that Ditty v. Check Rite, states the rule, (see Appellants' Brief,
pp.36, 38, 46, and 57.). In that case, the Federal District Court in Utah said:
Although some courts have inquired into the named plaintiffs' understanding
of the lawsuit or their character, that factor is generally given little weight. See,
e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 366, 15 L. Ed. 2d 807, 86
S. Ct. 845 (1966) (finding plaintiff an adequate class representative even though
"she did not understand the complaint at all, . . . could not explain the
statements made in the complaint, . . . had a very small degree of knowledge as
to what the lawsuit was about, . . . did not know any of the defendants by
name; . . .did not know the nature of their alleged misconduct, and in fact . . .
had merely relied on what her son-in-law had explained to her about the facts
in the case.") Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689, 117 S. Ct.
2231, 2251 & n.20 (1997) (looking solely to competence of counsel and
structural conflicts between named plaintiffs and other class members under
Rule 23(a)(4)).
Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd. 182 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D. Utah 1998).
A Plaintiff may be an adequate class representative even when he displays "a complete
ignorance of the facts concerning the transaction he was challenging." Shamberg v.
Ahlstrom, 111 F.R.D. 689, 695 (D.NJ. 1986).
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" T h e only relevant inquiry is whether the n a m e d plaintiffs are concerned is whether
they possess some interest that is antagonistic to other m e m b e r s of the class." Ditty v. Check
Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D, at 642 . "If there are any doubts about adequate representation, they
should be resolved in favor of upholding the class, subject to later possible
reconsideration."Newberg o n Class Actions, §7.24.
8.

T h e trial court did not a b u s e its discretion in finding p r e d o m i n a n c e and
superiority and a d e q u a t e u n d e r Rule 23(b) for the all three class a c t i o n s .

T h e Rule.

T o certify a class, the court must find,

that the questions of law or fact c o m m o n to the m e m b e r s of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual m e m b e r s , and that a
class action is superior to other available m e t h o d s for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.
Rule 23(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
T h e Trial Court's ruling. O n the issue of predominance, the court found:
T h e Court does find that because the claims presented in all of the p r o p o s e d
classes are based on alleged c o m m o n courses of conduct, which allegedly apply
to all of the m e m b e r s of the class, the issues presented in this action do
predominate over individual claims. In fact, it appears that this class action
encompasses almost all of the potential individual claims, with the exception of
those that have been severed from this case. T h u s , the p r o p o s e d classes all
meet the predominance requirement.
A d d e n d u m A, Trial Court Ruling, f 66, R O A 2174-2175).
This is n o t unreasonable.
9.

Car D e a l e r s m i s u n d e r s t a n d the test for superiority.

Car Dealers object to the finding that a class action is superior m e t h o d for
adjudicating the controversy because, they argue, the class representatives care m o r e about
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their own claims so their interest in prosecuting separate actions is antagonistic to the class.
(Appellants Brief, pp. 50, 60, 69).
In this case, the Car Dealers misapply the rule which considers "the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions." Rule 23(b)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The phrase, "interest of
members of the class" does not refer to class representatives, but to the interest of absent
class members in pursuing their own claims as evidenced by a number of separate actions
filed on the same issue. As the U.S. Supreme Court described this, "The interests of
individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call for denial of a class
action. On the other hand. . .the amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that
separate suits would be impracticable." Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
616 (1997). The trial court view this issue correctly. (Addendum A, Trial Court Order, ^[68,
ROA2173)
This case certifies claims which are so small, no individual could afford to pursue it,
and the Car Dealers' conduct would not change. As the Amchem Court observed,
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual
to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.
Amchem Products, Inc. V. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp.,
109 F.3d 338, 344(1997).
The trial court also followed the Utah Supreme Court's approval of class actions to
allow "access to the courts for numerous claimants to request redress of claims that are too
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small to merit the expenses of litigation on an individual basis." Call v. City of West Jordan,
727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986).
In this case, a class action is the only method for change and redress of the wrongs by
these Car Dealers. This case was properly certified.
VII.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the

trial court to deny the Car Dealers' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging
Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Polices. The plain language of the statute provides for a
claim by the policyholder.
The Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the trial court to Grant the
Policyholders' Motions for Certification of Class regarding vehicle theft policies (VTP), GAP
insurance and Dealer Documentary Service Fees because there was no abuse of discretion.
This Court should remand the case for further proceedings on the merits and
resolution as provided in Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this

day of August, 2009.
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES

JACKC.HELGESEN
MICHAEL V. H O U T Z
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